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ABSTRACT 
The vast empirical literature on wage differentials reflects extreme interest in the 
subject from economists, social scientists, and policymakers alike.  A review of the 
literature reveals two noticeable shortcomings.  First, nearly all past studies have assumed 
a linear relationship between earnings and worker characteristics without consideration as 
to the potential specification error this imposes on their estimates.  Second, researchers 
have generally focused on simple mean effects rather than estimating the effects of 
characteristics and wage rates on earnings distributions as a whole.  Using data from the 
American Community Survey, this dissertation addresses both issues with a simple 
nonparametric approach, and applies the method to measure wage differentials between 
federal and private sector workers, as well as wage differences between males and 
females.
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Federal and Gender Wage Differentials:
A Review
Eric Makela
July 2014
Abstract
The massive literature on wage differentials reflects great interest in the sub-
ject among social scientists. In fact, independent Google Scholar searches for
“federal wage gap” and “gender wage gap” return over one million cumulative
results. Due to technological and econometric advances, both differential liter-
atures have developed in a predictably similar way. This paper summarizes the
development of the federal and gender wage differential empirical literatures
and provides a short discussion of some theories of the origin of these wage
gaps.
1
1 Introduction
The empirical literature studying wage differentials is so vast one might mistake it for
a book of federal rules and regulations. This dissertation studies two of the primary
wage differential topics: gender wage gaps and public wage gaps. The purpose of this
chapter is to familiarize readers with the evolution of empirical techniques used to
measure wage differentials, as well as to introduce some of the theories regarding the
origin of these wage gaps. Although this list of research is in no way complete, it
should serve to demonstrate the advances of empirical work over the past 4 decades
and help to identify the contribution of the following papers to this massive collection.
Section 2 provides a concise summary of the main wage differential theories. Sec-
tion 3 outlines the empirical progress of researchers in the areas of gender and public
wage differentials, while section 4 identifies my dissertation’s niche in this literature
and concludes.
2 Wage Differential Theory
A number of theories exist on why individuals with otherwise similar observable
characteristics earn different wages for seemingly the same work. Compared to the size
of the empirical literature, relatively few studies offer theoretical models to identify
potential sources of wage differentials. Indeed, the primary focus of most research is
on proper measurement of otherwise unexplained earnings gaps rather than providing
a coherent explanation of the differential.
Probably the most notable theoretical explanation of wage differentials is that
of pure discrimination, either positive (in the case of federal employees) or negative
(in the case of women).1 Compensating differentials are cited by Moore and Raisian
1For a complete discussion of discrimination as the driving force behind wage differentials, see
Becker (1971).
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(1991) as the potentially primary source of wage gaps. For example, suppose some
particular characteristic of federal jobs, such as strict behavior policies or round-
the-clock oversight, causes them to be less desirable. To entice workers to accept
such job characteristics, federal agencies will have to pay higher wages to compensate
their workers for the additional mental strain these policies impose. Studies using
microdata rely on the assumption that, within reported occupation categories, federal
and private jobs are equal. Should this not be the case, it may be that the measured
wage differential is simply compensation for more undesirable job characteristics taken
on by federal workers.2
The efficiency wage theory suggests that wage differentials arise not due to dis-
crimination or systematic differences in job attributes between two groups, but rather
because there are gains to productivity and efficiency from paying particular groups
of workers more than others. If we consider differences in earnings by gender, firms
could rationalize paying their male employees more than comparable females if, for
example, males are more costly to recruit and train. This search interpretation is
discussed by Bowlus (1997), who concludes that a portion of the raw gender wage
gap is attributable to differences in labor market behavior between men and women.
Similar theories regarding public employees are discussed by Gunderson (1979) and
Bender (1998). In particular, if federal employees were given access to sensitive in-
formation, it may be optimal for agencies to have the lowest turnover rate possible,
resulting in higher wages for most skill groups in the federal sector.
Numerous competing theories are cited in the literature as potential sources of
observed wage gaps. Fogel and Lewin (1974) proposes that public wage differentials
might be the result of difficulties applying the “prevailing wage” principle, which
requires public entities to provide their employees “equal pay for equal work”. Not
2Or by men in the case of gender wage differentials.
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only does this method of wage-setting fail because wage comparability surveys include
only relatively large firms, but also because many jobs that exist in the public sector
are nonexistent in the private labor market. Gunderson (1979) and Borjas (1980) offer
some political explanations of the public-private wage gap. Borjas posits that public
workers might earn more due to the dual mandate of their positions: they seek to
provide public goods as well as produce political support for legislators. Gunderson
cites the lack of a profit constraint in federal agencies as another source of differential
pay practices. Short-run market disequilibria and union bargaining are also quoted
as potential sources of both gender and public wage differentials, although there is
little empirical evidence to support these arguments.
While some studies attempt to identify the source of wage differentials, others
posit that the lack of optimal data renders these attempts futile. In particular, Ra-
paport (1995) tests for bias in estimates of the gender wage gap for teachers where
wages are reportedly set in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Controlling for all personal
characteristics used in the wage-setting process, the study still finds evidence of wage
differentials. Rapaport concludes that, given her specification tests, her positive es-
timates could be the result of two potential data issues: measurement error or proxy
error.3
The only consensus among labor economists regarding the source of wage differen-
tials seems to be that the question will not soon be resolved. It should be noted that
my studies cannot contribute to the theoretical literature, and my empirical results
3Gender wage differentials would be measured if there are systematic tendencies for one sex to
misrepresent their human capital. For example, if females are more likely to overestimate their
education or experience, regression analysis would measure a positive wage premium for men even
if none existed (measurement error). Also, most micro datasets cannot perfectly measure human
capital. Suppose a data source reports the number of years of education an individual has but cannot
observe the quality of the education. If males tended to attend better quality schools than females,
estimates would confirm a wage differential even if it could be accounted for by school quality (proxy
error).
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could be interpreted as one, or some combination, of the theories presented above.
3 Evolution of the Empirical Wage Differential
Literature
This section will briefly describe many of the past studies in this literature. The em-
pirical contribution of past research on wage differentials are classified into one of six
categories based on their primary estimation method: linear Blinder-Oaxaca, dummy
variable approach, sample selection models, indirect methods, quantile regression,
and nonparametric models. Likely due to a multitude of reasons, the wage differen-
tial literature took flight after the developments of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).
Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s academic journals were rife with papers measuring
wage differentials using various forms of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Shortly
after the development of the primary sample selection correction method by Heckman
(1979), the differential literature evolved to include many variations of Heckman’s cor-
rection. During the late 1990’s and 2000’s, some attention has shifted to estimating
the distributional effects of gender and public employment as estimated by quan-
tile regression methods. Most recently, researchers have used a quantile regression
modification of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Although the wage differential
literatures evolved along much the same timeline, I will present literature reviews of
my two issues separately.
3.1 The Federal-Private Wage Gap
While conducting a review of this literature, a few sets of results seem particularly
noteworthy. First, under the realm of public employment in the United States, federal
employees are consistently estimated to earn significant wage premiums when com-
pared to private sector employees. Second, state government workers typically earn
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either zero wage premium or a negative premium, depending on the sample used in
the study. Last, local government workers are nearly always estimated to earn lower
wages than private sector workers after controlling for individual characteristics.4 To
simplify comparison and to provide an accurate portrayal of where my paper fits in
the literature, this section is restricted to studies of wage comparisons between the
private sector and the central (federal) government. Some relatively recent reviews
of the literature were performed by Bender (1998) and Gregory and Borland (1999).
Readers are referred to these for complete reviews of the public wage differential
literature prior to 2000.
In one of the earliest empirical studies of the earnings of public employees, Fo-
gel and Lewin (1974) set the benchmark for this literature. Using primarily wage
survey data, the authors compare mean earnings of public and private employees
controlling only for differences in occupation. The study concludes that workers in
some occupations receive federal pay premiums while those in other occupations do
not. Despite the inconclusiveness of their results, the study pinpoints a primary dif-
ficulty in all public wage comparison studies: the necessary assumption that public
and private jobs of the same occupational classification are, in fact, equal in terms of
job attributes. The authors conclude that empirical studies based on microdata are
unlikely to solve this issue soon.
The next empirical comparison of public and private wages came via Smith (1976)
and Smith (1977).5 Smith (1976) uses Census samples from 1960 and 1970 to estimate
linear Blinder-Oaxaca models to compare the earnings of federal and private sector
4The magnitudes of differential estimates vary notably depending on the sample and analytic
methods used, but these patterns tend to hold throughout the literature.
5Hammermesh (1973) studied the effects of government employment on union wages using a
variety of different methods. His study is excluded from this list because the results are confounded
by the union/nonunion dichotomy and are therefore not directly comparable to most other studies
in this area.
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workers. She found that on average, federal employees earn more. In 1960, approx-
imately 60-65 percent of the absolute differential is not accounted for by differences
in worker characteristics, and is labeled by Smith as an “Economic rent” accruing to
those individuals in federal jobs. After refining her sample slightly, Smith (1977) sep-
arates males and females to estimate federal wage differentials for each sex. Not only
did the females in her sample receive larger federal wage premiums than the males,
but a greater portion of the premium is not explained by measured characteristics.
Sharon Smith’s primary contribution was to set a benchmark for Blinder-Oaxaca de-
compositions of public wage premiums, and her work prompted similar research in
the United States and other countries.6
Subsequent Blinder-Oaxaca analyses generally have attempted to measure wage
premiums more accurately by adding theoretically relevant explanatory variables to
the wage equation.7 For example, Quinn (1979) utilizes the 1969 wave of the Retire-
ment History Study to measure wage premiums for workers in public administration
occupations. Quinn’s hypothesis was that public workers are more productive because
they generally have more firm-specific human capital than workers in the private sec-
tor, who tend to change employers more often; the RHS survey allowed Quinn to
control for both years of occupational experience and tenure at their current em-
ployer. His results suggest that federal public administrators earn an unexplained
wage premium of about 20 percent. However, Quinn also notes that federal workers
would earn more even if the two groups were paid equally because the federal work-
force tends to have more education, more training, longer job tenure, better health,
and also tends to be present in areas where wage rates are high.
Like Quinn (1979), many studies in this area have restricted their sample of public
6See Gunderson (1979) for an early analysis of public and private wages in Canada.
7For a complete listing of studies using linear Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions models, readers
are referred to the “Double equation technique” section of Bender (1998).
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workers to include only those in “public administration” occupations. Belman and
Heywood (1988) propose that past differential estimates have been biased upward as
a result of differences between wages in public administration and other government
positions. Although their sample includes all levels of public employees in their anal-
ysis, the authors estimate a 1.1 percent wage premium when all public workers are
included in the sample and a 6.6 percent wage penalty when public administrators,
which constitute approximately one third of all non-private observations, are removed
from the sample.
In an effort to further refine measurement of public wage differentials, Belman and
Heywood (1990) suggest that when government agencies set their wages, they aim to
set them comparable to those of workers in the largest private firms. Following the
same B-O methodology, Belman and Heywood (1990) document how the inclusion
of firm size in the wage equations drastically alters estimates of the public wage
premium. In particular, the inclusion of firm size reduces federal wage differential
estimates by 49 percent for females and by 25 percent for men. In general, Belman
and Heywood demonstrate how sometimes arbitrary sample restrictions or omitted
variable bias might cause past estimates of public wage differentials to overestimate
the true effect of government on an individual’s earnings. The trend in the empirical
literature is toward B-O models with an increasing number of explanatory variables;
in general, the more personal characteristics are accounted for in the model the smaller
the estimate of the federal wage differential.
An important update of empirical methods came when Belman and Heywood
(1989) noted that previous studies failed to account potential non-random selection
into public jobs. Following methods developed by Heckman (1979), Belman and Hey-
wood (1989) estimate a two-stage selection model correcting for non-random sorting
into employment sectors based on observables. Comparing results with and without
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the selection term, it is clear that addition of the first-stage correction alters estimated
marginal returns significantly. After controlling for selection into government work,
the authors estimate white males in public jobs to receive a wage penalty between 4
and 19 percent of the average private wage, depending on the particular subsample of
interest.8 In another study, Gyourko and Tracy (1988) correct for the endogeneity of
both employment sector and union status in their two-stage wage regression model.
The authors measure a federal wage premium between 18.8 and 28.9 percent, depend-
ing on if selection is based on worker characteristics or differences in returns to those
characteristics between sectors, and conclude that wage comparability legislation has
done little to shrink the gap between federal and private compensation.
Around the same time period of the selection literature, some researchers were
attempting to find indirect evidence that public employees receive a better overall
compensation package. As Long (1982) points out, most studies of public wage dif-
ferences are inconclusive, at least in terms of the magnitude of the estimates, because
“the lack of individual data on fringe benefits has made it impossible to compare total
compensation levels between similar workers in the public and private sectors.” Long
tests for overpayment by government agencies by comparing job separation behavior
in the public and private sectors. His evidence clearly suggests that nearly every type
of government employee, particularly federal workers, are significantly less likely to
quit or be fired from their jobs. Along similar lines, Venti (1987) provides evidence
that the skill groups which receive the largest federal wage premium are more likely to
accept federal jobs, although these workers are also the least likely to be offered one.
Venti uses 1982 CPS data to simulate the length of federal job queues; he estimates
that, given the prevailing federal wage differentials, almost three times as many men
and over six times as many women would be willing to work federal jobs as will be
8The sample includes public employees at all levels of government.
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hired.
Recently, researchers have changed their focus from measuring the average effect
of government employment to attempting to measure the distributional effects of gov-
ernment on individual earnings. Estimation of public wage differentials via quantile
regression has grown in popularity over the past two decades, and many studies have
been conducted applying this technique to foreign data.9 Further, using data from
the British SCELI survey, Bender (2003) shows it is possible to apply quantile regres-
sion methods to decompose raw wage differentials at deciles along the distribution of
earnings. Critics of this approach might argue that although it is an upgrade over
normal quantile regression and could be useful in identifying patterns of systematic
wage differentials, its results are extremely difficult to interpret. Perhaps for this
reason, to my knowledge no studies to this effect have been performed using data
from the United States.
3.2 The Gender Wage Gap
While theories of the gender wage gap had been proposed early in the timeline of
economic literature, it was at the heart of the women’s rights movement that empirical
estimates of the gap were first being published. Consensus among early empirical
works, among them Sanborn (1964) and Fuchs (1971), was that women in the 1950’s
earned an unadjusted wage approximately 60 percent that of men, and that adjusting
for productivity-related characteristics increases this estimate to 82 percent at most.
Although not based on modern econometric methods, these studies established a few
patterns that will persist throughout the male-female wage differential literature: 1)
Wage gaps are largest for self-employed workers and smallest for government workers
9For some examples, see Mueller (1998), Melly (2005), and Bargain and Melly (2008). Poterba
and Rueben (1994) study the distribution of wage premiums accruing to state and local government
employees in the United States.
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2) Wage gaps increase with age 3) A non-negligible portion of the wage gap can be
explained by occupational choice, as females are much more likely to be employed in
relatively low-salary occupations.
Much like the public-private wage differential literature, the mass of empirical
work on the gender wage gap came following the seminal work of Oaxaca (1973) and
Blinder (1973). Oaxaca’s study used data from the 1967 Survey of Economic Oppor-
tunity to calculate the first two-equation estimate of the female wage differential.10
He concludes that gender discrimination accounts for between 23 and 28 percentage
points of the total differential for whites and between 20 and 25 percentage points
of the total black differential.11 Almost simultaneously, Blinder (1973) published his
findings on the gender wage differential obtained from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. His results are similar to those of Oaxaca, estimating that only 13.8 per-
cent of the 45.6 percent raw wage differential could be attributed to the superior
characteristics of the male workforce, while the remaining 86.2 percent was due to
differences in estimated skill prices.
Utilizing datasets with a rich array of personal characteristics, researchers soon
began testing hypotheses which generally stated that a portion of the gender wage gap
was due to innate differences in personality and work preferences which led men and
women to prepare for the labor market differently. Using data from the NLSY 1972
cohort, Daymont and Andrisani (1984) find that job preferences, such as the need
to make money, be a leader, or helping others, leads the sexes to sort into different
career paths. When included in the first-stage regression of a B-O decomposition,
10Readers are referred to Fortin et al. (2011) for a review of the current state of empirical methods
based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.
11Subsequent studies point out that Oaxaca’s discrimination coefficient is simply the portion of
the raw differential that cannot be attributed to the productive characteristics in the wage equation.
Barsky et al. (2002) discusses several issues not pertaining to the decomposition method itself, but
rather potential misspecification of the wage equation.
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these preferences account for 3.4 percentage points of the 12.9 percent total wage
gap, a larger portion than is attributed to differences in estimated coefficients.12
One criticism of early research in the area is that it is impossible to perfectly
control for education quality and occupation. Wood et al. (1993) attempts to correct
this problem by investigating differences in male and female lawyer earnings using a
special dataset of University of Michigan Law School graduates. Because the survey
consists only of graduates, education quality is considered equal for all observations
and, since every individual has a law degree, all are expected to be employed as
lawyers. In the first year of work post-graduation, the majority of the 2.3 percent
earnings gap could be explained by hours worked and job setting (size of firm, pub-
lic/private, nonlegal, etc), while only an insignificant 0.1 percent was attributed to
discrimination. After 15 years of work experience, the data show a raw yearly earn-
ings gap of 48.5 percent; of this, 3.4 percentage points are due to increased family
responsibilities on the part of females, 12 percentage points are due to males working
longer hours, 15 percentage points are attributed to job setting, and 12.4 percent-
age points are “unexplained” or caused by potential discrimination on the part of
employers. Throughout their specifications, females are estimated to receive higher
wages due to superior human capital assets. Using a similarly-constructed dataset of
University of Chicago MBA graduates, Bertrand et al. (2010) provides evidence that
controlling for personal work preferences causes estimates of the gender earnings gap
to become insignificantly different from zero. The work of Wood et al. (1993) and
Bertrand et al. (2010) provide evidence for the family vs. career hypothesis of the
gender earnings gap, which suggests that young workers tend to have relatively equal
earnings, while the gap in wages grows as some females take time off and/or reduce
their work hours to take on additional family responsibilities.
12Fortin (2008) finds similar results from more recent cohorts of the NLSY.
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Other researchers have highlighted the importance of occupational choice and the
general change in the nature of work as important considerations in measurement of
the gender wage gap. In particular, Goldin and Polachek (1987) analyze changes in
the male-female earnings ratio from 1890 to 1970, finding that occupations requir-
ing schooling saw the most marked increase in the wage gap over that time period.
Perhaps more importantly, the authors find a noticeable decline in the returns to male-
dominated traits such as strength, and conclude that this phenomenon likely plays
a role in the decline of measured male-female earnings ratios over time. Along simi-
lar lines, Gronau (1988) estimates that, because males and females tend to sort into
different job categories, they acquire generally unequal levels of measurable human
capital. From this perspective, wage differentials arise not entirely from discrimina-
tion and differing levels of human capital, but also from preferences for certain kinds
of work, which Gronau (1988) shows to be crucial in explaining the sex differential in
training and wages. This and all aforementioned studies have all been based on the
traditional Blinder-Oaxaca approach of estimating monetary returns to worker traits.
However, as noted by Hellerstein et al. (1999), without some measure of worker
productivity it is impossible to determine if measured wage differentials reflect dis-
crimination, differences in worker productivity, or other confounding factors. Their
study utilizes the new Worker Establishment Characteristics Database (WECD)
which allows workers to be matched with employer characteristics such as firm size
and output. After many robustness checks, the authors conclude that, while females
are estimated to have slightly lower marginal productivity than males, the wage differ-
ential is greater than the productivity gaps, suggesting other factors must be at play
in the wage-setting process. Deriving estimates from the WECD merged with the
Longitudinal Research Datafile, Hellerstein et al. (2002) test whether market compe-
tition for profits serves to reduce or eliminate the gender wage gap, finding evidence
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of increased profitability in firms that hire a greater percentage of females. Meng
(2004) uses a unique employee-employer matched dataset to estimate negative “firm
effects” on the gender wage gap, to the magnitude of 2 to 5 percent, suggesting that
within-firm pay comparability practices narrow the measured gap between male and
female earnings.
As with other differential literatures, there has been a shift towards estimation of
differences in the distribution of male and female earnings. The recent development of
quantile regression has fostered a number of studies from research economists outside
the United States.13 Most recently, Boudarbat and Connolly (2013) offers insights
on the wage gap distribution in Canada by performing decomposition analysis at
various points in the total wage distribution. Their results indicate that women at
the bottom of the wage distribution have more valuable characteristics than men in
the same position, yet earn 2.6 percent less; at the 90th percentile, males are more
likely to be employed in high-wage industries, which partially accounts for the 8.2
percent raw wage differential.14
In general, recent papers attempting to accurately assess the gender earnings gap
fall into one of three categories: those attempting to assess the distribution of the wage
gap, those utilizing linked employer-employee datasets to find indirect evidence of the
wage gap based on firm performance, and those with specialized datasets intended to
better control for differences in occupation and human capital. The following papers
fall into the first category.
13See Mueller (1998) and Galego and Pereira (2010) for some examples. Arulampalam et al. (2007)
compares the distribution of the male-female earnings gap across European countries.
14Baro´n and Cobb-Clark (2010) applies the same quantile decomposition method to Australian
data.
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4 Conclusion
Although this summary of the literature is in no way complete, I hope it will serve
as a general guide to its development. As data and computing power have become
increasingly available, so have the capabilities of researchers to produce accurate
estimates of wage differentials.
The magnitudes of wage differential estimates vary greatly by sample and ana-
lytical methodology. Estimates of the federal wage differential range from around 2
to 40 percent.15 Estimates of the gender wage gap have ranged from 0 to about 30
percent.16 Both differentials have been shown to shrink over the period from 1970 to
2010 likely due to social changes, wage comparability legislation, and superior data,
which allow researchers to control for more of the characteristics and work preferences
that play a role in both job selection and wage offers.
One aspect of the differential literature which remains to be fully investigated is
the effect of functional form assumptions on measured wage gaps.17 The following
papers in my dissertation provide three important updates of the current literature.
First, I relax all functional form assumptions to obtain nonparametric estimates of the
federal and gender wage differentials using recent data from the American Community
Survey. Second, I compare these estimates with those obtained using a classical
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model to test for potential specification error. Last,
I am able to estimate counterfactual wage densities to assess the impact of wage
rates on the distribution of earnings. My results suggest that past studies may have
overestimated the true wage differential due to errors in functional form, although
since no studies have been conducted using the ACS no direct comparison can be
15For studies where a representative sample of both males and females are included.
16Using data from the last 50 years.
17The only exception being Rapaport (1995), who discusses the effects of potential measurement
error and proxy error in differential estimates.
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made. In general empirical studies are attempting to find more accurate measures of
true wage differentials, and the following papers offer a potentially important starting
point.
16
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Measuring the Federal Wage Premium:
A Nonparametric Approach
Eric Makela
July 2014
Abstract
Recently, the earnings of federal workers have come under renewed scrutiny.
Past research has consistently concluded that positive wage premiums have ac-
crued to federal workers over recent decades, but has all been based on highly re-
strictive statistical assumptions. This paper utilizes recently-developed econo-
metric techniques which do not require functional form specification to measure
the federal wage differential. I find the average wage premium accruing to fed-
eral employees is approximately 10.8% for men and 22.4% for women. I provide
evidence that the compressed nature of the federal earnings distribution is due
to the wage structure rather than the distribution of productive characteristics
in the federal sector. Evidence also suggests the popular linear Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition is ill-equipped to measure federal wage differentials for specific
groups of interest, and that the more pliable nonparametric approach should
be utilized when possible.
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1 Introduction
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, federal employees have comprised greater
than 2 percent of all workers every year since records became available in 1939.1 U.S.
public employment totals climbed to their highest level in history in 2009 amidst
growing fiscal consternation at federal, state, and local levels of government. Now
more than ever, the systematic differential of wage incentives between the public and
private sectors is an important topic of study. While empirical research on the public
earnings premium in the United States has been scant in recent years,2 numerous
past studies have attempted to measure differential wages paid to federal, state, and
local government workers. Results have varied greatly depending on the dataset,
explanatory variables, and functional form specification.3
All past research on the topic of federal wage differentials has relied on linear func-
tional form assumptions.4 The purpose of this paper is to apply recently developed
techniques to measure the yearly earnings differential between private sector and fed-
eral workers. The nonparametric matching method proposed here does not require
specification of a functional form, and thus will not introduce potential bias resulting
from misspecification. I estimate propensity score functions which allow us to weigh
observations in order to control for differences in the joint distribution of explanatory
variables between sectors. In this way, I study the federal earnings premium using a
program evaluation approach requiring less restrictive assumptions than those made
in previous research on the topic.
1Calendar year 2007 being the lone exception, when federal workers constituted 1.99 percent of
all working people.
2See Borjas (2002) for a noteworthy exception.
3Estimated federal differentials vary widely among specification and group of focus. See Smith
(1977), Belman and Heywood (1989), and Belman and Heywood (1990) for examples. Also, see
Bender (1998) for a summary of the literature.
4Fogel and Lewin (1974) is the sole exception, although occupation is the only human capital
variable the authors are able to control for.
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The study finds that the average federal salary for males is $6,718 greater than
the average yearly salary in the private sector. If male federal employees were com-
pensated according to the value of their skills in the private market, earnings for the
average federal worker would fall by 10.8 percent; if men working in the private sector
were paid federal wages, the average private sector worker is estimated to earn ap-
proximately 7.5 percent more. I estimate large federal premiums for unskilled workers
and negative premiums for workers with at least a bachelor’s degree. Although the
linear and nonparametric models produce similar point estimates, I provide evidence
that the assumptions underlying linear estimates are likely untrue, suggesting the
nonparametric treatment effects approach should be used when data allow.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the data and
variables used in the paper. Section three discusses the public labor market litera-
ture and describes previous methods used to analyse the federal earnings premium.
Section four introduces notation and estimates average federal treatment effects, com-
paring results with those derived from linear models. Section five presents earnings
density estimates to supplement previous treatment effect calculations, and section
six investigates earnings premium estimates for specific cases of interest in the federal
workforce.
2 Data and summary statistics
Data used in the analysis are from the American Community Survey, a yearly survey of
households conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.5 The dataset allows identification
of 3-digit occupational code, as well as differentiating between federal, state, and local
government employees. State and local government workers are excluded from the
sample for consistency purposes, although a similar analysis of the wage structure for
5Alexander, Doeken, Genadek, Ruggles, Schroeder, and Sobek (2010) of the IPUMS project.
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these workers would also be enlightening. The study is restricted to observations aged
25 to 65 who have completed at least nine years of education, were working at the time
of the survey, and were not enrolled in school. The sample also excludes employees
who have worked fewer than 40 weeks over the past year, who report working fewer
than 30 hours in a typical workweek, or who work for nonprofit organizations.6 Also
excluded from the dataset are 141,048 observations who are not matched with either
private or federal government counterparts.7 Restricting the sample as such allows
focus on earnings of workers whose time is fully invested in their occupation.
Summary statistics for the dataset can be found in appendix table A.1. Annual
earnings are adjusted to 2011 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. The average
male federal salary is $6,718 more than the average male salary in the private sector.
Females in federal jobs do relatively better than men, earning an average income
$16,229 higher than females employed in the private sector. High school graduates
comprise 16.78 percent of male federal employees, compared to 31.05 percent of pri-
vate males. Also, a federal employee chosen at random is more than twice as likely
to have attained an advanced degree than a random worker in the private sector.8
The federal government tends to employ older workers, as a significantly greater per-
centage of their workforce has at least 25 years of workforce experience.9 Male and
6Also, the sample excludes military personnel and individuals living in institutions or other group
quarters. Self-employed workers are also omitted from the sample. Observations reporting hourly
wages below $5.75 are also excluded, as these are either mistakenly coded or extreme outliers in the
light of all other exclusions.
746,703 males and 94,345 females were not matched with observations from the opposite sector,
reflecting a fair amount of sector-specific specialization.
8Education categories are clearly defined in the ACS survey. Observations with some college are
defined as those who report having between zero and four years of college, but less than a Bachelors
degree. The advanced or professional degree category is comprised of individuals who report having
attained a Master’s, professional, or Doctoral degree.
9Experience is calculated separately for each education category. For high school dropouts,
experience = age-18. For high school graduates, experience = age-20. For those with some college,
experience = age-21. For workers with a Bachelor’s degree, experience = age-22. For those with an
advanced or professional degree, experience = age-25.
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female scientists constitute a greater proportion of the federal workforce, while service
occupations (except for protective services) are much more prevalent in the private
sector. While the data suggest federal workers are likely paid higher wages due to
their superior education and experience assets, it is unclear that federal jobs always
require superior or specialized skills. For example, over 19 percent of both male and
female federal workers are classified as mail and message distributors, thus postal
workers represent a sizable portion of federal employment.
Table 1 documents mean earnings by education and sector. It is clear that a larger
percentage of the federal workforce has attended at least some college, while private
firms tend to hire more blue-collar workers. Those federal workers with less than a
Bachelor’s degree are paid more on average than similarly educated workers in the
private sector, while those with at least a Bachelor’s degree earn less on average. It
is also clear from the table that the federal government generally hires more a more
educated workforce.
Table 2 shows the distribution and mean earnings by 5-year experience groups.
The table provides evidence that a randomly chosen federal employee is likely to have
more workforce experience than a random employee at a private firm. It is also clear
from the table that all experience groups earn sizeable average federal pay premiums,
and that the federal earnings gap is larger for more experienced workers.
Appendix tables A.2 and A.3 document the mean earnings and mean federal
differential by occupation. Positive mean federal wage differentials exist for male
federal employees in 30 of the 40 defined occupational categories, and for females in
37 of these occupations. Police and protective service personnel receive the largest
average federal premium, while lawyers in federal jobs earn significantly less than
those in the private sector.
The intent of this paper is to provide a thorough analysis of the effects of differen-
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Table 1: Distribution and mean earnings, by sex, education and sector
Federal Private
Observations Mean Observations Mean
Total Percent earnings Total Percent earnings
Males
HS Dropout 698 1.13 $49,318 86,758 4.98 $39,170
HS Graduate 10,329 16.78 $55,066 540,793 31.05 $47,594
Some college 16,414 26.67 $63,831 507,741 29.15 $59,707
Bachelor’s degree 19,405 31.52 $85,277 423,712 24.33 $98,737
Advanced degree 14,710 23.90 $111,823 182,576 10.48 $148,309
Total 61,556 100.00 $80,425 1,741,580 100.00 $73,707
Females
HS Dropout 801 1.20 $40,182 47,628 3.27 $26,876
HS Graduate 15,676 23.49 $47,950 451,248 30.98 $33,000
Some college 23,605 35.37 $54,586 540,210 37.08 $42,044
Bachelor’s degree 15,079 22.59 $71,994 303,968 20.87 $65,092
Advanced degree 11,580 17.35 $95,610 113,685 7.80 $94,836
Total 66,741 100.00 $63,905 1,456,739 100.00 $47,676
Table 1: The sample consists of 1,803,136 males and 1,523,480 females. All data are
self-reported to the U.S. Census Bureau.
tial wage rates in the federal and private sectors on the federal wage differential while
controlling for differences in basic human capital, and to compare the nonparametric
treatment effects with those obtained from other estimation methods. While previous
research has often assumed the effects of federal employment are homogeneous for all
skill groups,10 it has been well documented that this is likely a false assumption. This
suggests a more pliable, less restrictive estimation method should be used.
3 Previous methodologies
The earnings of public employees were the focus of many studies by labor economists
in the years following the work of Hammermesh (1973), Ehrenberg (1973), and Fo-
10Borjas (2002) is the most recent notable paper to make this assumption.
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Table 2: Distribution and mean earnings, by sex, experience and sector
Federal Private
Observations Mean Observations Mean
Experience Total Percent earnings Total Percent earnings
Males
0-5 years 1,507 2.45 $59,363 38,202 2.19 $57,156
6-10 years 4.845 7.87 $61,926 204,663 11.75 $52,700
11-15 years 5,114 8.31 $74,816 188,743 10.84 $66,744
16-20 years 6,911 11.23 $79,129 235,546 13.52 $72,928
21-25 years 7,712 12.53 $82,414 236,228 13.56 $78,796
26-30 years 11,058 17.96 $86,336 272,249 15.63 $81,969
31-35 years 11,673 18.96 $82,883 251,164 14.42 $79,721
36 + years 12,736 20.69 $84,319 314,785 18.07 $78,367
Total 61,556 100.00 $80,425 1,741,580 100.00 $73,707
Females
0-5 years 1,555 2.33 $54,569 41,382 2.84 $47,791
6-10 years 4,117 6.17 $55,466 156,612 10.75 $42,265
11-15 years 4,075 6.11 $62,865 126,977 8.72 $49,115
16-20 years 5,892 8.83 $62,754 163,391 11.22 $49,426
21-25 years 7,773 11.65 $63,458 174,352 11.97 $50,732
26-30 years 11,272 16.89 $67,825 222,545 15.28 $50,504
31-35 years 13,253 19.86 $65,822 208,273 14.30 $48,613
36 + years 18,804 28.17 $63,596 363,207 24.93 $44,967
Total 66,741 100.00 $63,905 1,456,739 100.00 $47,676
Table 2: The sample consists of 1,803,136 males and 1,523,480 females. All data are
self-reported to the U.S. Census Bureau.
gel and Lewin (1974). Studies of federal compensation in the United States, from
Smith (1976) to Borjas (2002), have consistently found a positive and significant
wage premium for federal employees. Readers are referred to Bender (1998) and Gre-
gory and Borland (1999) for a complete survey of the literature pertaining to the
earnings of workers in the central government prior to 2000. While approaches vary,
the theoretical basis of the public labor market literature is derived from the notion
that public production and thus compensation decisions are made differently by gov-
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ernment administrators than by private business managers. Numerous explanations
of government wage differentials have been offered in the literature, some of which
include productivity differentials, lack of budget constraints in central governments,
and difficulty in pay comparability due to job differentiation between government and
private work. Political constraints are also cited as a potential reason for this phe-
nomenon, suggesting that political pressures may induce a misallocation of resources
between the government and private markets.11 Various reasons for this are discussed
in Bator (1958) and Demsetz (1964); since my empirical results cannot identify the
source of measured wage differentials, the presence of any form of government failure
will not be not be discussed in this paper. Regardless of cause, a plethora of stud-
ies have confirmed the existence of U.S. federal wage premiums through a variety of
methods.
3.1 Dummy variable approach
The most simple empirical approach to estimating public wage differentials is through
use of a dummy variable. Using this method, both private and public sector wages
are estimated simultaneously according to the equation
ln(wi) = Xiβ + Siδ + i, (1)
where ln(wi) is the log of yearly earnings for person i, Xi is a vector of the produc-
tive characteristics of person i, and i a person-specific error term. Si is an indicator
variable equal to one if the individual is working in a public job, thus the coefficient
estimate δˆ is said to measure the effects of government enterprise on an individual’s
observed wage rate. For U.S. federal government workers, this approach consistently
yields positive coefficient estimates for the public sector dummy,12 suggesting rents
11Refer to the theoretical sections of Gunderson (1979) and Borjas (1980) for discussion.
12The size of wage differentials does change significantly by sample. For instance, large wage
differentials to the magnitude of 37% are observed for women, much larger than that for men.
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Table 3: Log wage premiums using the dummy variable approach, males only
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Federal 0.02* 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.08*
HS Grad 0.22* 0.15* 0.15* 0.13* 0.15*
Education Some college 0.43* 0.28* 0.30* 0.29* 0.27*
Bachelor’s degree 0.87* 0.55* 0.44* 0.64* 0.54*
Advanced degree 1.23* 0.79* 0.61* 0.90* 0.78*
6-10 yrs 0.20* 0.22* 0.21* 0.22* 0.21*
11-15 yrs 0.34* 0.34* 0.23* 0.34* 0.43*
16-20 yrs 0.47* 0.43* 0.25* 0.43* 0.57*
Experience 21-25 yrs 0.49* 0.40* 0.35* 0.49* 0.66*
26-30 yrs 0.55* 0.53* 0.37* 0.53* 0.72*
31-35 yrs 0.56* 0.53* 0.42* 0.54* 0.73*
36+ yrs 0.49* 0.48* 0.42* 0.49* 0.70*
Married 0.22* 0.18* 0.18* 0.18* 0.18*
Occupation x x x x
State of work x x x x
Specification Educ x Exper x
Educ x Occup x
Exper x Occup x
Table 3: The * symbol indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the
99 percent level. There are 61,556 male federal employees in the eleven year sample,
along with 1,741,580 male private sector workers. The federal dummy variable equals
one if the respondent was currently employed by the federal government at the time
of survey. The married dummy variable equals one if a respondent is married with
their spouse present and zero otherwise.
may be accruing to federal employees. The dummy variable approach is based on the
econometric assumption that productive characteristics such as education and expe-
rience are rewarded equally in both sectors, and there exists no correlation between
S and .
Five specifications of (1) are estimated and results recorded in tables 3 and 4,
with explanatory variable Federal representing the estimate of δˆ in equation (1). The
Public wage differences are also much greater on the low end of the wage distribution, and for racial
minorities. Wage differential estimates are lower and often negative for state and local government
employees.
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Table 4: Log wage premiums using the dummy variable approach, females only
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Federal 0.26* 0.21* 0.21* 0.22* 0.21*
HS Grad 0.22* 0.14* 0.13* 0.18* 0.14*
Education Some college 0.46* 0.26* 0.43* 0.39* 0.26*
Bachelor’s degree 0.88* 0.55* 0.63* 0.73* 0.54*
Advanced degree 1.21* 0.77* 0.84* 0.99* 0.77*
6-10 yrs 0.15* 0.16* 0.28* 0.17* 0.19*
11-15 yrs 0.26* 0.26* 0.34* 0.26* 0.37*
16-20 yrs 0.33* 0.31* 0.32* 0.32* 0.47*
Experience 21-25 yrs 0.37* 0.40* 0.35* 0.35* 0.54*
26-30 yrs 0.39* 0.36* 0.41* 0.37* 0.58*
31-35 yrs 0.39* 0.37* 0.45* 0.37* 0.57*
36+ yrs 0.36* 0.34* 0.48* 0.35* 0.53*
Married 0.02* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*
Occupation x x x x
State of work x x x x
Specification Educ x Exper x
Educ x Occup x
Exper x Occup x
Table 4: The * symbol indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 99
percent level. There are 66,741 female federal employees in the eleven year sample,
along with 1,456,739 female private sector workers. The federal dummy variable
equals one if the respondent was currently employed by the federal government at the
time of survey. The married dummy variable equals one if a respondent is married
with their spouse present and zero otherwise.
dependent variable in each regression is the log of yearly earnings. In all specifications,
male federal employees are estimated to earn between 2 and 9 percent more than their
private sector counterparts, while results suggest females earn a federal premium
between 21 and 26 percent. Due to the large sample size, all coefficients are highly
significant. Moore and Raisian (1991) apply this technique using the 1979 and 1983
CPS samples, estimating federal hourly wage premiums between 7 and 13 percent.
In his somewhat recent study of public wage premiums over time, Borjas (2002) finds
the male federal differential fell throughout the 1980’s, then fluctuated between 0 and
29
9 percent during the 1990’s while the female differential remained steady between 20
and 29 percent throughout the same period.
3.2 Linear Oaxaca-Blinder approach
If one thinks productive characteristics might be valued differently in the private
sector than in government work, the dummy variable approach will provide biased
estimates of the true effect of government employment on an individual’s earnings.
Another common empirical method of deriving wage differentials was introduced by
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), and involves estimating wage equations separately
for each group. Sharon Smith (1976) was the first to use the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position method for study of federal employees in the United States, finding evidence
of large federal wage differentials for hourly workers. Numerous subsequent studies13
use this approach to find smaller unexplained wage differentials for federal employees
in the U.S. and Canada. This method can be applied by first estimating
ln(wis) = Xisβs + is. (2)
In the above equation, s denotes sector of employment; linear estimation of (2) is
straightforward and allows productive characteristics to be valued differently in the
private and government markets. Estimation gives the mean log wage in sector s
as ln(w¯s) = X¯sβˆs, where X¯s are the mean attributes of sector s employees and βˆs
are the estimated skill prices for those attributes in sector s. Slight manipulation
of the estimates X¯s and βˆs gives the familiar linear version of the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition of earnings premiums
w¯f − w¯p = Σ(βˆf − βˆp)X¯f + Σ(X¯f − X¯p)βˆp, (3)
13See Smith (1977), Gunderson (1979), and Freeman (1987) for some examples.
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where f denotes the federal sector and p denotes the private sector. The difference
between the average federal and average private wage is now split into two portions.
The second term on the right will amount to the nominal inter-sector difference in
wages that can be attributed to higher average levels of education, experience, or
other productive characteristics. This leaves the first term on the right side to equal
the portion of the federal wage premium attributable to differential skill prices in the
federal and private markets, which is the primary statistic of interest in the public
labor market literature.
Note that the first term on the right side is a measure of the wage advantage en-
joyed by federal employees that is attributed to differences in skill valuation between
sectors. In other words, if federal agencies value a particular set of characteristics
more than private firms, workers with those characteristics will receive a federal wage
premium. In the program evaluation literature, such preferential treatment is called
a treatment effect. If we consider federal employees the recipients of federal “treat-
ment”, the first term in decomposition (3) can be interpreted as a linear estimate
of the average effect of treatment on the treated. Note also that equation (3) uti-
lizes the private sector as its choice of weight, resulting in a measure of the average
treatment effect on the treated, or ATT. Gregory and Borland (1999), among others,
note that one may decompose wage differentials using a variety of weighting methods.
An alternative would be to rearrange terms to estimate the average treatment effect
on the untreated, or ATU. This is analogous to estimating the wage differential as
w¯f − w¯p = Σ(βˆf − βˆp)X¯p + Σ(X¯f − X¯p)βˆf , thus the ATU is measured by the first
term on the right hand side of the equation.14
14It is also possible to decompose the mean wage gap using any linear combina-
tion of the two decompositions described above. In particular, ln(w¯f ) − ln(w¯p) =
Σ(X¯f − X¯p)βˆ∗ + X¯f (βˆf − βˆ∗) + X¯p(βˆ∗ − βˆp), where βˆ∗ is some linear combination of the federal
and private skill price estimates. The issue with this approach is that there is no consensus on
exactly what βˆ∗ should be. I ignore this problem by setting βˆ∗ equal to βˆp or βˆf , resulting in the
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I estimate (3) using the sample of individuals defined previously; results are re-
ported in table 5. The raw male differential15 is approximately 22.9 percent of mean
private sector earnings. Estimated average treatment effects are somewhat greater
for the treatment group than for the control. Estimates of average treatment effects
are displayed in bold text to highlight their importance. Results indicate the average
male in the federal workforce receives a skill price premium of about 10.9 percent,
while the average male in the private market would receive a premium of 7.9 percent
should he receive a federal job. While women earn less on average than men in both
sectors, they earn significantly higher federal pay premiums, a result consistent with
the findings of past research. The average female in the federal workforce receives
a wage premium of 22.5 percent that is not accounted for by measurable productive
characteristics. Sharon Smith (1976) argues that these unexplained premiums are
equivalent to economic rents accruing to federal employees, although from an empir-
ical viewpoint they amount to the portion of the federal wage gap that cannot be
attributed to variables in the empirical model. Results still indicate there exists a
significant unquantifiable difference in compensation practices between sectors.
Attempts at decomposing federal wage differentials have led researchers to vastly
different estimates of the true wage premium. For example, Smith (1976) finds unex-
plained federal wage premiums of 30-32 percent, while Belman and Heywood (1990)
find much smaller unexplained premiums. Chronologically, there has been a trend
toward smaller unexplained residuals. However, no estimation procedure or set of
explanatory variables will cause a misspecified model to produce the correct results.
This paper utilizes a different approach from that repeated in the literature.
Rather than simply adding explanatory variables to a likely misspecfied model, I
twofold decompositions presented above.
15ln(w¯f )− ln(w¯p)
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Table 5: Linear Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
Males only Females only
w¯f − w¯p 0.229 0.381
(X¯f − X¯p)βˆp 0.120 (0.04) 0.156 (0.03)
(βˆf − βˆp)X¯f → Linear ATT 0.109 (0.02) 0.225 (0.02)
(X¯f − X¯p)βˆf 0.150 (0.02) 0.186 (0.02)
(βˆf − βˆp)X¯p → Linear ATU 0.079 (0.02) 0.195 (0.02)
N 1,803,136 1,523,480
Table 5: Regressions include five education dummy variables, eight experience dummy
variables, and forty occupation dummy variables.
measure the federal wage premium using a nonparametric method which imposes no
functional relationship between variables. Although less statistically efficient than a
correctly-specified linear model, the nonparametric specification will provide superior
measures of wage differentials if the relationship between skills and earnings is not
truly linear.
4 Empirical Model
The primary empirical contribution of this paper is to obtain the first federal earn-
ings differential measure which does not assume a priori knowledge of the wage equa-
tion’s functional form. This study views the measurement of federal wage differentials
through the lens of program evaluation, where federal workers are seen as the treat-
ment group and private sector workers the control.16 Using this methodology, I am
16I rationalize assignment of these groups as follows. In the private market, competition for profits
should result in wage rates equal to the marginal productivity of the worker. Any worker paid more
than his/her marginal product will be released from the firm or have their wages lowered; any
worker paid below his/her marginal product would eventually be bid away by competing firms. The
absence of a profit motive and hard budget constraint in the federal government is likely to lead
to a misallocation of resources as well as rent-seeking behavior on the part of federal agencies and
their employees (see Bator (1958) and Demsetz (1964) for discussion). Thus the private sector was
chosen as the control group because observed wage rates are more likely to reflect true productivity
33
able to relax two restrictive assumptions made in previous research. First, because
tables 1-4 suggest federal treatment does not affect the earnings of all workers equally,
these effects are modeled as heterogeneous. I also eliminate the assumption of linear
functional form. Because the true relationship between worker characteristics and
salary is unknown, this removes any potential specification bias from the results.
We are able to relax homogeneity and functional form assumptions by using
propensity score matching techniques. As in the program evaluation literature, we
are then able to estimate the average effects of federal employment while removing
possible selection bias. Note the impact of federal employment on an individual’s
earnings can be written
τi = wi(fed)− wi(pri), (4)
where wi(fed) is the worker’s federal wage and wi(pri) is the worker’s wage in the
private sector. Clearly, one of these wage rates can be observed in cross-sectional data,
while the other cannot, thus estimating the employer effect in the case of individuals
is not possible in this setting.
It is possible, however, to estimate average treatment effects for specific groups
of interest. While the federal workforce utilizes labor with a wide variety of skills,
some skill groups are sparsely populated, suggesting federal jobs are not intended
for workers of all kinds. Due to this, we focus the study on the average treatment
effect on the treated and untreated rather than the federal effect on the labor force
as a whole. The average effect of treatment on the treated, or ATT, is identified
by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) as the most prominent statistic in the program
evaluation literature. In the current setting, denote the ATT as
τATT = E(w(fed)|S = 1)− E(w(pri)|S = 1), (5)
via measurable output.
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where S = 1 implies the group having federal characteristics and S = 0 implies the
group having private sector characteristics. We might also be interested in the effect
treatment would have on the untreated population, in this case private sector workers.
The average treatment effect on the untreated, or ATU, is
τATU = E(w(fed)|S = 0)− E(w(pri)|S = 0), (6)
and measures how much the average private sector worker’s earnings would change if
he/she were to acquire a federal job. Similarly, (5) measures how the average federal
employee’s wages would change if he/she were to leave federal employment for private
sector work.
Note that this approach is analogous to the linear Oaxaca-Blinder model, only
with the added benefit of removing linearity assumptions, avoiding possible misspec-
ification of the relationship between earnings and worker characteristics. I also relax
the original model’s homogeneity assumption by letting the wage effects of federal
employment vary among workers. Relaxation of these assumptions leads to a more
accurate and serviceable model with which to measure federal earnings premiums.
4.1 A hypothetical example
Allow us to continue by investigating a simple economy with q different types of
workers who are paid an average wage of wq. Let us also denote expected wages in
the private and federal sectors respectively as Epri(w) and Efed(w). It follows that
mean, or expected, wages in each sector are
Epri(w) =
J∑
j=1
pij,priwj,pri (7)
Efed(w) =
J∑
j=1
pij,fedwj,fed, (8)
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Table 6: Expected wage calculations in the federal and private sectors
Type Federal wage Ratio of federal Private wage Ratio of private
workforce workforce
1 $10,000 1
3
$10,000 1
3
2 $20,000 1
3
$20,000 1
2
3 $30,000 1
3
$30,000 1
6
Efed(w) = $20, 000 Epri(w) = $18, 333
τATT = $0 τATU = $0
Table 6: Federal workers earn more on average in this example, but not because of
differential pay.
where the weights pi represent the fraction of each worker type in that sector. As
shown in table 1, mean federal earnings are significantly higher than mean private
earnings. Without conditioning on worker characteristics, a simple comparison of
these statistics is misleading. Specifically, proper comparison of expected earnings
requires weights pi to be equal across sectors. By conditioning on observable charac-
teristics, I am able to evaluate the federal earnings premium, or the difference between
expected earnings in the federal sector and expected earnings in the private sector.
To better frame the previous discussion, consider a hypothetical nation in which
workers differ on only one dimension. For each type of worker, wages are equal in
the federal and private sectors of the economy: type 1 workers earn $10,000, type 2
workers earn $20,000, and type 3 workers earn $30,000.
The approach taken in this paper can be easily summarized by table 6. A naive
comparison indicates that federal workers earn more on average than workers in the
private sector. However, we know that conditional wages are the same regardless of
employer. The initial analysis is flawed because mean earnings in each sector are cal-
culated using different weights, meaning we are not measuring the effect of differential
wages, but rather the effect of greater skill employed by the federal government.
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However, it is straightforward to assess the federal premium in terms of treatment
effects by imposing identical skill compositions in the two sectors. In the program
evaluation literature, researchers attempt to eliminate bias by matching observations
with similar observable characteristics. By matching the skill characteristics in the
two sectors, the effect of treatment, which in this case is employment by a federal
agency, is isolated. In particular, the estimate of τATT , or the average treatment
effect on the treated, is simply the weighted mean federal wage gap where weights are
determined by the workforce composition of the federal sector. Likewise, τATU assesses
the mean federal wage gap using the private workforce composition as weights, and
is said to measure the average treatment effect on the untreated. Note that this
statistic is equal to zero in both cases, indicating the nonexistence of federal earnings
premiums in our hypothetical world. Note that analysis by either dummy variable or
linear Oaxaca-Blinder approaches in this case will also result in an estimate of zero
government wage premium when accounting for worker type.
The previous example illustrates the spirit of the nonparametric approach pro-
posed here. It is clear however, that individuals vary on many dimensions. This
is the primary shortcoming of Belman et al. (1994),17 who employ the methodology
proposed here using the occupational composition of public and private workforces
in the Wisconsin Wage Survey as a means of constructing weights, finding evidence
of wage premiums for state and local government employees. A small sample size
limits their ability to study additional distributional effects, hence this paper offers
a vast improvement over the work of Belman et al. (1994), as I am able to control
for other vital observable characteristics in the estimation process via superior data.
While use of this method is non-existent in the federal labor market literature, similar
17This is also a prevalent issue in Fogel and Lewin (1974), who were the first to use the approach
in studying public wage differentials.
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approaches have proven fruitful to differential estimation in other arenas.18 Because
use of this reweighting technique for study of federal wage differentials is currently
lacking, the purpose of this paper is to fill the gap of knowledge by demonstrating its
use in this area.
4.2 Propensity score matching
In order to remove selection bias from the treatment effect calculation, we must
account for differences in productive characteristics between the treated and untreated
groups. To do this, we must first estimate
θ(X) = Pr(S = 1|X). (9)
θ(X) is a propensity score which measures the likelihood of an individual being a
federal worker given his/her exact characteristics X, and its use in the program
evaluation literature is well documented.19
Propensity score θ(X) can be estimated in one of two ways depending on the
method of matching used. The sample can be split into cells based on categorical
variables X then the proportion of observations in each cell calculated. This method
allows the researcher to easily reweight observations such that the distribution of
productive characteristics is equal in both sectors. To calculate average treatment
effects, observations are then matched based on propensity score. The primary ad-
vantage of this characteristic matching method is that each observation in the federal
sector is perfectly matched with private sector observations with the same observable
productive assets. Characteristic matching therefore offers the best nonparametric
approximation of average treatment effects because all information is used and only
18DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) study the effects of minimum wage and other labor market
institutions on wage distributions, while Butcher and DiNardo (2002) use a similar approach in their
comparison of immigrant and native wage distributions in the United States.
19See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).
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comparable observations are matched with each other. Although there are costs asso-
ciated with this approach,20 the significant benefits outweigh the cost increased data
requirements for my analysis.
Alternatively, θ(X) can be estimated using a standard discrete choice model,
leading to a different class of matching estimators. Although observations are still
matched based on their estimated propensity score, so-called nearest-neighbor match-
ing matches observations from the federal sector with those observations in the pri-
vate sector with the closest propensity score. Note that both methods will result in
observations with the same characteristics having equal propensity scores. Nearest-
neighbor matching, however, does not allow treated individuals to be matched with
more than one nontreated person. When the treatment group is significantly smaller
than the control, nearest-neighbor matching will eliminate all non-matched private
observations from the sample, thus potentially important information is lost. In
cells which have more federal than private sector workers, federal employees will be
matched with private observations that may have very different characteristics. By
imposing a functional form on the propensity score estimate, discrete choice models re-
duce the curse of dimensionality which plagues characteristic matching. However, the
fact remains that nearest-neighbor matching can result in less than optimal matches.
For comparability purposes, the effects of federal treatment on yearly earnings is
estimated using both characteristic and nearest-neighbor matching.
In order to interpret the results, some statistical assumptions are needed. Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983) formalize the assumptions needed for strong ignorability of
treatment assignment, which allow results to be interpreted as unbiased. The first of
20Notably, the characteristic matching method suffers the curse of dimensionality, meaning that
additional explanatory variables potentially exacerbate the common support requirement. However,
I am still able to control for personal characteristics which affect an individual’s productivity and
consequent earnings.
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these conditions is conditional independence of outcomes. Formally, this assumption
can be summarized as
(w(fed), w(pri))⊥S|X,
where ⊥ denotes independence. The conditional independence assumption requires
that outcomes (earnings in this case) are independent of treatment after controlling
for all observable characteristics X, and are thus there is no selection into employment
sector based on unobserved characteristics. While Pfeifer (2008) provides evidence
that individuals who are more risk-averse will tend to sort themselves into the public
sector, it is not plausible to collect and correctly interpret such data. Since measures
of innate skill, risk aversion, or attitude toward government are unavailable, there is
little choice but to accept this point as a limitation of the model.
The second condition needed for strong ignorability is that of common support.
In order for proper inference to be made regarding average treatment effects on a
population, there must be sufficient characteristic overlap between the treatment and
control groups. Thus it is necessary that
0 < Pr(S = 1|X) < 1,
meaning that each federal worker must have at least one comparable private sector
observation. Should these conditions hold, treatment assignment can be considered
strongly ignorable, which allows the researcher to eliminate selection bias based on
observables by accounting for characteristic differences between the treatment and
control groups.
4.3 Empirical estimation
Estimation of treatment effects requires matching based on characteristics or propen-
sity scores. Define expected earnings in sector s conditional on propensity score as
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Es(w|θ(X)). The conditional gap between federal and private wages is then
Q(X) = Efed(w|θ(X))− Epri(w|θ(X)), (10)
thus Q(X) measures the gap between mean federal and mean private wages of
matched groups. Note that while observations with equal characteristics will receive
the same propensity score, treatment effect estimates will vary depending on the type
of matching used.
Treatment effects are calculated by measuring the impact on wages while keeping
workforce characteristics constant. Allow g(X|S) to be the distribution of charac-
teristics in sector S. The average treatment effect on the treated is then estimated
as
τATT = E(w(fed)|S = 1)− E(w(pri)|S = 1) (11)
=
∫
Q(X)g(X|S = 1)dX.
The federal composition of workforce skill is thus used to estimate a weighted mean
treatment effect. The average effect of treatment on the untreated is
τATU = E(w(fed)|S = 0)− E(w(pri)|S = 0) (12)
=
∫
Q(X)g(X|S = 0)dX,
and measures the increase in wages that would be realized by an average member of
the control group (the private sector).
Estimation of τATT and τATU results in a point estimate of the wage effect of federal
employment for the average worker in the treated and untreated groups, respectively.
To calculate standard errors in the characteristic matching model, a simple bootstrap
was used. Both statistics were calculated in 1000 repetitions of sample size N drawn
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with replacement.21 Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered by the state in which
the job is performed.
Although the nonparametric approach requires significantly more data, this com-
plication eliminates a potentially worrisome property of linear O-B estimation meth-
ods. First, it eliminates the need to specify a functional form in the wage equation.
Also, as noted by Barsky et al. (2002), linear regression minimizes mean square error
for each sector’s wage estimation. However, MSE is not necessarily minimized in
estimation of counterfactuals, thus over- or underestimating both expected counter-
factual wages and the contribution of explanatory variables. By estimating treatment
effects using nonparametric matching, I eliminate any specification error in both wage
regressions and counterfactuals.
4.4 Federal wage differentials
This section examines average federal treatment effects for men in the federal and
private sectors. Raw wage gaps are seen in the first column of results in tables 7
and 8. Men in federal jobs earn approximately 22.9 percent more on average than
men employed by private firms. Table 8 shows that by comparison, federal wages for
average females are just over 38 percent higher than private sector wages. As noted
previously, these estimates should be viewed as naive approximations of true federal
wage premiums. If the federal government hires a more educated and experienced
workforce, or if their workers perform jobs which are on average more valuable than
those in the private sector, a positive differential should be expected. Estimates based
on (11) and (12), corresponding to the second and third column of results respectively,
and give the mean weighted federal earnings gap.
21Nearest-neighbor matching estimates were derived through 10 replications using the “psmatch2”
Stata command.
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When characteristic matching is used, I estimate federal employment increases
earnings of the average male federal worker by 10.8 percent while the wage effect is
only 7.5 percent for the average worker in the private sector. Another interpretation
of these average treatment effects is possible. Should a random male federal employee
lose his job and accept a new job in the private sector, he is expected to earn 10.8
percent less than previously. Likewise, if a random male working in the private sector
were to obtain a federal job, it is estimated he will earn 7.5 percent more than he
made in his private sector job.
Nearest-neighbor matching estimates slightly different effects. Notably, the fed-
eral treatment wage effect on the average federal employee is estimated to be 9.2
percent, while the effect for the average private worker is 9.8 percent. Because there
exist some skill groups which are more numerous in federal work, nearest-neighbor
matching with replacement produces noticeably larger standard errors. As noted by
Lechner (2002), unnecessary inflation of the estimated variance will result in this case
because a potentially small number of private sector observations will be repeatedly
used in matching. In other cases where the number of private workers outnumber
comparable federal employees, unmatched private observations are simply removed
from the estimation sample, causing further inflation of estimated standard errors.
Table 7: Federal treatment effects, males only
Matching method Raw differential τATT τATU
Characteristic matching 0.229 0.108 0.075
(0.011) (0.019)
Nearest-neighbor matching 0.229 0.092 0.098
(0.037) (0.019)
Table 7: Bootstrapped standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Nearest-neighbor
matching utilizes a probit model to estimate propensity scores. Earnings are measured
in 2011 dollars as the log of yearly labor income. Average log earnings are 10.947 in
the private sector and 11.176 in the federal sector.
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Table 8: Federal treatment effects, females only
Matching method Raw differential τATT τATU
Characteristic matching 0.381 0.224 0.189
(0.015) (0.019)
Nearest-neighbor matching 0.381 0.204 0.187
(0.032) (0.017)
Table 8: Bootstrapped standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Nearest-neighbor
matching utilizes a probit model to estimate propensity scores. Earnings are measured
in 2011 dollars as the log of yearly labor income. Average log earnings are 10.559 in
the private sector and 10.940 in the federal sector.
Table 8 documents a similar series of estimates obtained for women. Matching
based on observable characteristics, the calculated ATT suggests females in federal
work receive an average premium of approximately 22.4 percent; nearest-neighbor
matching predicts a slightly smaller effect. An average woman working in the private
sector is estimated to earn between 18.7 and 18.9 percent more should she receive
a federal job. Results suggest that, in general, characteristic matching offers more
precise estimates of average treatment effects in this setting, and should be used when
the data allow.
Although the evidence presented here is compelling, it would be remiss to not
state the possibility that the explanatory variables do not adequately capture all
wage-determining characteristics, and it is these omitted variables through which the
earnings differential arises. If this is the case, we can infer only that my estimates mea-
sure the effects of all factors other than education, experience, and occupation. For
example, if federal agencies tend to employ people who tend to be more hardworking
than those in the private sector, average treatment effects would be overestimated. If
this is not the case, the estimated federal treatment effect can be attributed solely to
the difference in conditional wages between sectors, meaning that a randomly selected
individual from the workforce will likely earn a significant wage premium in federal
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work.
4.5 Comparison with linear estimates
Having estimated the federal earnings premium for men and women using nonpara-
metric models, it is appropriate to compare the findings to those obtained by more
standard estimation procedures. Results of both models for males are shown in table
9, and hint that while the methods vary in their apportionment of measured wage
premiums, point estimates of average treatment effects are similar in all three models.
In comparison, nonparametric characteristic and nearest-neighbor matching meth-
ods imply that 40-48 percent of the raw earnings gap can be attributed to differential
treatment of federal employees. The linear OB model predicts that 10.9 percent of
the mean differential is attributable to preferential treatment in federal work, thus
little specification error can be observed. Nonparametric models predict the gains
to be had for a private sector worker receiving a federal job are slightly less than
estimated by the linear model.
Table 9: Performance of linear and nonparametric models, males only
Model τATT
100× τATT
0.229
τATU
100× τATU
0.229
Raw differential = 0.229
Linear 0.109 47.6 0.079 34.5
(0.024) - (0.023) -
Nonparametric (characteristic) 0.108 47.2 0.075 32.8
(0.011) - (0.019) -
Nonparametric (nearest-neighbor) 0.092 40.2 0.098 42.8
(0.037) - (0.019) -
Table 9: Percent columns refer to the portion of the raw earnings differential at-
tributed to treatment effects. The linear model includes 5 education, 8 experience,
and 40 occupation dummies. The nonparametric models includes full interaction
terms in addition to these variables.
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Table 10: Performance of linear and nonparametric models, females only
Model τATT
100× τATT
0.381
τATU
100× τATU
0.381
Raw differential = 0.381
Linear 0.225 59.1 0.195 51.2
(0.029) - (0.026) -
Nonparametric (characteristic) 0.224 58.8 0.189 49.6
(0.015) - (0.019) -
Nonparametric (nearest-neighbor) 0.204 53.5 0.187 49.1
(0.032) - (0.017) -
Table 10: Percent columns refer to the portion of the raw earnings differential at-
tributed to treatment effects. The linear model includes 5 education, 8 experience,
and 40 occupation dummies. The nonparametric models includes full interaction
terms in addition to these variables.
Result comparison for females are displayed in table 10. Again, linear and char-
acteristic matching models produce very similar point estimates. A generally higher
portion of the raw differential is attributed to differences in skill prices for women
than for men. Also noticeable is that estimates of τATT are, with the exception of
the male nearest-neighbor estimate, greater than τATU , suggesting potential positive
selection into federal work for members of both sexes.
The linear specification estimated here utilizes only explanatory variables used in
the nonparametric models, although this need not be so. It is certainly the case that
linear models may include a far greater number of explanatory variables without the
exponential increase in data requirements which limits the effectiveness of nonpara-
metric approaches. In this way, linear models may reduce the incidence of omitted
variable bias. It is unclear as to the validity of the functional form assumption, thus
in order to determine if this is the case, a more in-depth investigation is needed.
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5 Counterfactual wage densities
Although previous sections suggest measurement of federal differentials through dif-
ferencing of weighted means, it is possible to generalize the decomposition techniques
to estimate entire counterfactual wage densities. The density of wages in each sector
can be written as the integration of the conditional wage density over the distribu-
tion of productive assets in that sector. Allow fs(w) to represent the wage density for
workers in sector s. Formally, earnings densities for the private and federal workforces
respectively, are
fpri(w) =
∫
hpri(w|X)g(X|pri)dX (12)
ffed(w) =
∫
hfed(w|X)g(X|fed)dX. (13)
Above, hs(w|X) is the wage density conditional on productive characteristics X and
g(X|s) is the density of productive characteristics in sector s.
Under the assumption that alterations to the distribution of productive charac-
teristics will not induce changes to the conditional wage density in either sector, we
can imagine what the density of earnings in each sector would be if they were paid
the skill prices given in the opposite sector. Optimally, the researcher would like to
estimate
f fedpri (w) =
∫
hfed(w|X)g(X|pri)dX (14)
fprifed(w) =
∫
hpri(w|X)g(X|fed)dX. (15)
Interpretation of these statistics is relatively straightforward. (14) is an estimate of
the private sector wage density if workers were instead paid federal wages, while (15)
estimates the federal wage density if its employees were paid their private market
values.
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However, researchers cannot observe these counterfactuals directly since an indi-
vidual worker’s earnings in the opposite sector are unknown. But these densities can
be estimated empirically using the characteristic reweighting method.22 In particular,
I can estimate
f fedpri (w) =
∫
θpri(X)hfed(w|X)g(X|fed)dX (16)
θpri(X) =
g(X|pri)
g(X|fed) .
Equation (16) is identical to (14) and can be interpreted as such. Similarly, it is
possible to estimate (15) as
fprifed(w) =
∫
θfed(X)hpri(w|X)g(X|pri)dX (16)
θfed(X) =
g(X|fed)
g(X|pri) .
This visual exercise allows evaluation of the effect of the wage structure on the entire
workforce. In a sense, I am able to assess whether the shape of earnings densities are
due to the skills in that workforce or the skill prices offered in that sector. All that
is needed is a reliable method of density estimation.
5.1 Kernel density estimation
Allow gˆ(w0s) to represent the empirical density estimate in sector s at yearly salary
w0. The earnings density is estimated by the kernel function
gˆ(w0s) =
θ
h
n∑
i=1
K
(
Wis − w0s
h
)
, (15)
where h is the bandwidth and g is the univariate density of wages. The θ above are
observation-specific weights, which depend on w0s and the type of kernel function
used in estimation.
22Also note that such counterfactual densities could be estimated using the linear O-B approach.
In this case, we might calculate wfedpri = Xfedβˆpri and w
pri
fed = Xpriβˆfed, then estimate the density of
these counterfactual wages. It is assumed here that there is no variability of wages when conditioning
on explanatory variables X.
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An important consideration in kernel density estimation is the choice of band-
width. Although the dataset is not lacking in observations, a proper bandwidth is
needed to maintain a balance between bias and variance in the density estimates.
Large bandwidths result in kernel estimates with low variance and high bias; selec-
tion of a small bandwidth will reduce the bias at the expense of higher variance. To
select the bandwidth for each density estimate, this paper utilizes the plug-in tech-
nique proposed by Sheather and Jones (1991). Also relevant is the choice of kernel
function. The Epanechnikov kernel is used here, although tests of alternative kernel
functions suggest this issue is of little empirical importance in this instance.
Kernel estimates of federal and private sector male earnings densities are shown in
figure 1a. Federal workers do not appear to be paid very low wages, and the variance
of yearly earnings appears to be much lower in the federal sector. The wage gap is
also apparent in the figure, as federal male workers earn an average of $80,425 while
average earnings are only $73,707 in the private sector, suggesting a naive federal
earnings advantage of $6,718 for male workers. Figure 1b documents the female wage
densities for the two sectors, which appear visually similar to their male counterparts
aside from the noticeably larger mean wage gap.23
5.2 Wage density estimates
As is clear from figure 1, both mean earnings and earnings densities in the federal and
private sectors differ significantly. Many potential reasons exist for this disparity.24
It has been documented that federal employees are on average more educated and
experienced than their private sector counterparts, accounting for a portion of this
differential.
23Average female earnings in the federal sector are $63,905 and average earnings are $47,676 in
the private sector. The mean federal wage differential for females is then $16,230.
24See Bender (1998) for a summary of the theoretical literature.
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Figure 1: Federal and private earnings densities
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We wish to employ a nonparametric model to demonstrate exactly how these
characteristics affect the prevailing wage densities. In order to perform this visual
experiment, observation weights θ(X) must first be calculated. Observations are
divided and sorted into cells according to their personal characteristics. The analysis
focuses on 5 education groups, 8 experience groups and 40 occupations, resulting in
a total of 5 x 8 x 40 = 1600 cells, or bins in each sector. The weight for each cell can
be simplified conceptually to
θpri(X) =
αpri(n)
βfed(n)
, n ∈ 1, 2, ..., N (16)
θfed(X) =
βfed(n)
αpri(n)
, n ∈ 1, 2, ..., N, (17)
where n represents the bin number and N is the number of bins. αpri(n) is the fraction
of private sector workers in education, experience and occupation bin n, while βfed(n)
is the fraction of federal employees in the same bin. In order to obtain a consistent,
fully nonparametric estimate of propensity score function θ(X), it is necessary that
n
N
→ 0 as n→∞ and N →∞.
Kernel density estimates using this procedure are displayed in the following figure.
In addition to the federal and private sector densities (the solid and dashed lines, re-
spectively), two alternative wage densities are estimated, denoted by the dotted line.
Figure 2a estimates the male private earnings density under the counterfactual as-
sumption that private sector workers are valued as they are by the federal government.
Figure 2b predicts the density of earnings that would prevail for male federal sector
workers if the productive characteristics of its workers were valued as they are by the
private market.
Observed mean log earnings for male federal workers in the sample are 11.18, while
mean log earnings for private sector employees are 10.95. The vertical line represents
the mean value for each alternative earnings density. Figure 2a suggests that given
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Figure 2: Federal, private, and counterfactual kernel density estimates, males
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federal skill prices, the density of earnings in the private sector shifts to the right;
mean log earnings rise from 10.95 to 11.02.25 Figure 2b implies that if federal workers
were paid as their private sector counterparts, the wage density would more closely
match that of the true private wage density. Mean log earnings for federal employees
would fall from 11.18 to 11.07, but are more widely dispersed.26 This implies that
the low variance of wages in the federal sector is not due to its workers having similar
characteristics, but rather is due to the federal compensation scale. These estimates
correspond to average male treatment effects from table 7.
Note that the gap between the federal and counterfactual lines in figure 2a repre-
sents treatment effects for men in the private workforce. Given federal wages, there
appears to be greater mass near the mean of the private wage density. Given pri-
vate wages, the wage density for federal sector workers is more dispersed, displaying
higher variance with more mass at the tails. We call the gap between the private and
counterfactual wage densities in 2a to be the effect of treatment on the untreated.
observed gap to solely to differences in conditional wage functions between sectors.
Analogously, the gap between the countrefactual and federal lines in figure 2b sig-
nifies the effects of federal treatment on the treated population. If the conditioning
variables adequately capture all wage-determining characteristics, these gaps can be
attributed solely to differences in conditional wage functions between sectors. If we
assume that unobserved characteristics also play a role in the wage-setting process,
the aforementioned gaps signal the effects of all variables other than education, ex-
perience, and occupation.
Estimation results for female workers are displayed in figure A.1. When the private
25The standard deviation of log earnings in the private sector falls from 0.68 to 0.52 under the
federal pay scale.
26If federal workers were compensated with private sector wages, the standard deviation of log
earnings in that sector would rise from 0.49 to 0.71, and would thus display more variance than
wages in the private sector.
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workforce is given federal compensation, mean log earnings rise from 10.56 to 10.75.
When federal sector female workers are paid private skill prices, mean log earnings fall
from 10.94 to 10.72. Similar to the results for men, the distribution of wages displays
much lower variance under the federal wage structure. Again, those individuals near
the top of the earnings distribution tend to do relatively worse when given federal
earnings. Not only do the figures offer visual confirmation of federal wage premiums,
but provide further evidence that the effects of federal employment are far from
homogeneous.
6 Further investigation
All results thus far have controlled for differences in the observable characteristics
education, experience, and occupation, although making different assumptions re-
garding the relationship between these variables. Of course, there may be reasons to
focus on more narrowly defined groups. One might wish to investigate federal wage
competitiveness for a very particular type of worker; alternatively, a private firm may
need to determine the wage it must offer in order to compete with the federal gov-
ernment for the best employees. This section explores relative wage profile estimates
obtained from the three empirical models discussed in the paper.
Possibly the most noteworthy occupational group of federal employees are mail
carriers. Comprising more than 20 percent of the male federal workforce, individuals
in this occupation earn significant average wage premiums as shown in tables A.2
and A.3. With over 500,000 full time employees and over $45 billion in salaries and
benefits paid in 2012,27 the U.S. Postal Service is the largest federal entity currently
participating in a consumer market.
Figure 3a displays estimated federal log earnings differentials for male postal work-
27Data from the United States Postal Service.
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Figure 3: Estimated federal wage premiums by age, males only
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(b) Health services, some college
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ers with a high school degree.28 The dummy variable model, adopted from specifi-
cation (5) in table 3, estimates that all male federal employees receive a log wage
premium of 0.08 regardless of education, age, or occupation. Using the linear O-B
approach, I find federal earnings premiums between 50 and 60 percent for mail car-
riers. Nonparametric models suggest linear O-B will overestimate the federal wage
premium for this skill group, while the dummy variable approach will vastly underes-
timate the premium. While the magnitudes of estimates vary significantly by cohort
using the nonparametric approach, it is clear that the two parametric models are mis-
specified in this instance, and that workers in this skill group receive greater monetary
compensation from federal agencies than the private market.
Figure 3b demonstrates that differential estimates for some skill groups vary even
more significantly by age and analytical method. While the linear models perform
comparably for health service workers, the nonparametric model suggests the gap
between federal and private sector earnings grows substantially by age, an observation
which may lead to testable hypotheses regarding occupation and sector-specific human
capital accumulation or labor market attachment.
Results for women are found in appendix table A.1, and document more variability
in federal differential estimates than those for men. In particular, nonparametric
models estimate some female mail carriers earn a wage premium surpassing 50 percent;
lawyers are estimated to earn significantly less in federal jobs.
Visual results in this section further the earlier assertion that parametrically-
specified models might measure differentials incorrectly, either under or overestimat-
ing the true differential for some skill groups. Researchers for their part must exer-
cise caution when performing quantitative analysis of treatment effects, particularly
if there are numerous groups of interest for which treatment effects might differ.
28These workers are classified as “Communications, mail, and message distribution.”
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More implications regarding the variation in differential earnings across ages for
both skill groups are possible. It may be that mail carriers and health service workers
in the federal and private markets reach their earnings peak at different ages. Another
possibility is that unobserved cohort-specific skills cause the relative productivity of
these groups to differ between the federal and private sector. Irrespective of cause,
linear decomposition methods predict the relative earnings trajectory for all federal
workers as compared to their private counterparts to be the same, simply adjusted
based on educational attainment. In order to test theoretical hypotheses, it is vital to
have the most accurate measures of federal wage differentials that are possible. The
nonparametric model proposed in this paper can be viewed as a potentially important
upgrade of current techniques.
7 Conclusion
The preceding analysis has measured the federal earnings premium using a variety of
methods. I first examine the dummy variable approach, which concludes that male
federal employees earn a wage premium between 2 and 9 percent while females earn
a federal premium between 21 and 26 percent. However, summary statistics suggest
that the effects of federal employment are likely heterogeneous across skill groups, a
fact which invalidates inference using this approach.
Second, I estimate federal earnings gaps using the linear O-B model. These esti-
mates suggest that the average federal male employee earns 10.9 percent more than
he would in the private sector, while the average private sector male worker earns
7.9 percent less than he would were he given a federal job. These point estimates
are similar to those obtained from the nonparametric matching model. However,
subsequent analysis provides evidence that the two models do not perform quite so
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comparably in all situations. Even within narrowly-defined skill groups, differential
estimates vary widely between methods, suggesting that the functional form imposed
by parametric models may result in specification error.
To remove the specification error, I estimate two nonparametric models. When
all data is utilized via characteristic matching, males are estimated to earn a federal
premium of 10.8 percent while federally employed females receive an average wage
advantage of 22.4 percent. When nearest-neighbor matching models are used, esti-
mates of the federal earnings premium decrease to 9.2 and 20.4 percent for males
and females, respectively. The nonparametric models demonstrated here makes no
assumption regarding the functional form and will thus never introduce specification
error into the results. Matching methods also allow for heterogeneity of treatment ef-
fects, with treatment in this case being employment by a federal agency. The benefit
of relaxing these assumptions is that the approach provides more reliable and accu-
rate estimates than parametric models when the functional form is unknown, while
the cost is a simple increase in data requirements. Of course, researchers generally
will not be able to compare multiple methods, nor have they a predetermined notion
of whether the estimated relationship is truly linear. With the vast data archives
available to statisticians and social scientists today, there would appear to be little
need to make such restrictive assumptions when more advanced statistical methods
are available.
It should also be noted that wage income measures only a portion of the likely fed-
eral earnings differential. The U.S. federal government spent $69.4 billion on federal
employee pension contributions in the 2010 fiscal year, and there is speculation that
federal pensions represent a disproportionately high percentage of total compensation
as compared to an average private sector pension. Federal workers also receive health
coverage in higher proportions than their private counterparts. It is therefore likely
58
that this paper has underestimated the true federal earnings premium.
A common theme among all results is a positive and significant wage premium
accruing to federal workers in the sample. Some skill groups, such as postal workers
and police, earn wage premiums much higher than the average federal worker while
other groups, such as lawyers and managers, tend to earn less in federal work than
they otherwise would in the private market. At most, we may attribute the remaining
unexplained wage gap to differential wage determination practices in the federal and
private sectors. At a minimum, we can attribute this gap to all wage-determining fac-
tors other than education, experience, and occupation. The nonparametric matching
model’s generality leaves much in this topic to be investigated, and its lack of restric-
tive assumptions makes it an attractive alternative to parametric specifications when
the functional form is unknown.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of the sample by sex and sector
Male Female
Federal Private Federal Private
Mean yearly earnings (2011 $) 80,424.83 73,706.69 63,905.36 47,675.78
Std. dev. of yearly earnings (2011 $) 42,889.48 70,538.52 34,486.12 42,384.02
Education
HS Dropout 1.13 4.98 1.20 3.27
HS Graduate 16.78 31.05 23.49 30.98
Some college 26.67 29.15 35.37 37.08
Bachelor’s degree 31.52 24.33 22.59 20.87
Advanced degree 23.90 10.48 17.35 7.80
Experience
0-5 years 2.45 2.19 2.33 2.84
6-10 years 7.87 11.75 6.17 10.75
11-15 years 8.31 10.84 6.11 8.72
16-20 years 11.23 13.52 8.83 11.22
21-25 years 12.53 13.56 11.65 11.97
26-30 years 17.96 15.63 16.89 15.28
31-35 years 18.96 14.42 19.86 14.30
36 + years 20.69 18.07 28.17 24.93
Occupation
Managers 11.97 15.82 13.05 11.83
Accountants and auditors 2.59 1.76 3.63 3.21
Analysts, HR, and labor relations specialists 1.67 2.19 4.44 3.05
Inspectors and management support 2.85 1.15 3.26 1.50
Engineers 6.89 4.11 1.15 0.67
Mathematical and computer scientists 4.28 2.59 3.91 1.48
Natural scientists 5.21 0.58 2.48 0.37
Health diagnosis and treatment 1.99 1.54 5.09 6.21
Teachers (primary and secondary) 0.94 0.45 2.34 1.87
College and university instructors 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.27
Librarians, archivist and curators 0.24 0.02 0.43 0.05
Social scientists and planners 1.20 0.23 0.80 0.30
Lawyers 2.85 1.08 2.50 0.66
Artists and entertainers 0.77 1.69 0.90 1.68
Health technicians and specialists 0.64 0.43 1.86 2.93
Science technicians 2.30 1.49 1.07 0.57
Software developers 1.52 2.22 1.41 0.74
Other operators and technicians 1.85 0.63 1.63 1.33
Service sales representatives 0.11 1.43 0.13 1.50
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Commodities sales representatives 0.31 7.63 0.85 6.84
Office supervisors 3.57 1.14 3.63 3.27
Receptionists and typists 0.31 0.33 1.60 3.08
Secretaries 0.21 0.17 5.28 7.69
Records and financial clerks 0.63 0.51 2.98 5.76
Communication, mail, and message distribution 19.62 3.27 19.03 3.02
Adjusters and investigators 1.12 1.53 3.21 5.19
Miscellaneous administrative support 0.99 0.54 4.13 3.91
Police, fire, and protective services 9.38 0.66 3.29 0.31
Food preparation and services 0.16 1.78 0.46 3.31
Health service occupations 0.19 0.24 0.90 4.04
Building and personal services 1.90 2.19 1.58 2.60
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations 1.10 1.68 0.50 0.39
Automobile and electric mechanics and repairers 3.34 8.14 0.42 0.43
Construction workers 1.68 6.59 0.13 0.20
Extractive occupations 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00
Precision production workers and supervisors 1.12 4.60 0.45 2.19
Machine operators 0.50 4.29 0.21 2.57
Welders and hand-assembly occupations 0.48 3.23 0.33 2.11
Transportation and material moving occupations 2.00 7.53 0.36 0.75
Helpers and other laborers n.e.c. 0.92 4.29 0.39 2.11
Observations 61,556 1,741,580 66,741 1,456,739
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Table A.2: Male mean earnings, by occupation and sector
Occupation Federal Private Differential
Managers 105,653 118,472 -12,819
Accountants and auditors 86,351 105,341 -18,990
Analysts, HR, and labor relations specialists 88,706 121,969 -33,263
Inspectors and management support 85,741 79,254 6,487
Engineers 97,447 94,247 3,200
Mathematical and computer scientists 91,519 83,376 8,143
Natural scientists 89,622 98,736 -9,114
Health diagnosis and treatment 141,131 153,634 -12,503
Teachers (primary and secondary) 67,736 57,529 10,207
College and university instructors 92,726 72,543 20,183
Librarians, archivist and curators 80,681 61,900 18,781
Social scientists and planners 113,192 118,559 -5,367
Lawyers 128,277 199,022 -70,745
Artists and entertainers 85,669 72,718 12,951
Health technicians and specialists 70,357 60,951 9,406
Science technicians 68,158 58,803 9,355
Software developers 93,570 98,158 -4,588
Other operators and technicians 112,307 74,709 37,598
Service sales representatives 94,154 132,486 -38,332
Commodities sales representatives 60,428 75,042 -14,614
Office supervisors 89,277 65,725 23,552
Receptionists and typists 51,051 49,439 1,612
Secretaries 65,913 50,136 15,777
Records and financial clerks 61,479 49,973 11,506
Communication, mail, and message distribution 54,892 44,669 10,223
Adjusters and investigators 64,775 55,064 9,711
Miscellaneous administrative support 59,523 55,973 3,550
Police, fire, and protective services 75,330 41,917 33,413
Food preparation and services 42,076 31,732 10,344
Health service occupations 54,919 40,227 14,692
Building and personal services 55,409 40,132 15,277
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations 55,584 34,754 20,830
Automobile and electric mechanics and repairers 57,708 51,371 6,337
Construction workers 60,783 54,692 6,091
Extractive occupations 71,740 62,684 9,056
Precision production workers and supervisors 67,163 54,856 12,307
Machine operators 57,104 43,730 13,374
Welders and hand-assembly occupations 63,050 45,348 17,702
Transportation and material moving occupations 58,858 46,689 12,169
Helpers and other laborers n.e.c. 46,274 37,937 8,337
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Table A.3: Female mean earnings, by occupation and sector
Occupation Federal Private Differential
Managers 81,505 75,271 6,234
Accountants and auditors 69,233 62,053 7,180
Analysts, HR, and labor relations specialists 72,892 69,666 3,226
Inspectors and management support 72,938 57,132 15,806
Engineers 88,026 76,199 11,827
Mathematical and computer scientists 81,715 69,485 12,230
Natural scientists 77,284 76,509 775
Health diagnosis and treatment 82,690 67,774 14,916
Teachers (primary and secondary) 47,214 37,615 9,599
College and university instructors 67,932 55,461 12,471
Librarians, archivist and curators 74,292 53,084 21,208
Social scientists and planners 91,901 80,684 11,217
Lawyers 113,262 148,152 -34,890
Artists and entertainers 70,011 55,681 14,330
Health technicians and specialists 52,808 44,004 8,804
Science technicians 56,548 47,686 8,862
Software developers 83,921 80,877 3,044
Other operators and technicians 71,789 50,738 21,051
Service sales representatives 79,339 69,189 10,150
Commodities sales representatives 42,382 42,394 -12
Office supervisors 71,944 45,515 26,429
Receptionists and typists 40,384 31,424 8,960
Secretaries 46,092 37,554 8,538
Records and financial clerks 47,873 36,194 11,679
Communication, mail, and message distribution 48,331 33,566 14,765
Adjusters and investigators 54,309 38,392 15,917
Miscellaneous administrative support 46,232 33,764 12,468
Police, fire, and protective services 66,348 36,467 29,881
Food preparation and services 24,621 22,722 1,899
Health service occupations 36,209 28,089 8,120
Building and personal services 44,334 29,142 15,192
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations 54,804 27,012 25,792
Automobile and electric mechanics and repairers 56,375 47,740 8,635
Construction workers 61,989 44,275 17,714
Extractive occupations 41,871 53,291 -11,420
Precision production workers and supervisors 48,349 35,269 13,080
Machine operators 41,612 30,076 11,536
Welders and hand-assembly occupations 50,089 32,800 17,289
Transportation and material moving occupations 45,628 34,407 11,221
Helpers and other laborers n.e.c. 35,891 25,597 10,294
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Figure A.1: Federal, private, and counterfactual kernel density estimates, females
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Figure A.2: Estimated federal wage premiums by age, females only
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(c) Communication, mail, and message distributors, high school degree
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Appendix B
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a clear explanation of the empirical pro-
cess, from sample creation to differential estimation. The following pages give precise
instructions to obtaining my estimates, including variable categorization, sample ex-
clusions, and coding (if deemed necessary). Anyone attempting to recreate my study
may contact me at emakela@g.clemson.edu if they run into insurmountable issues.
Creating the sample
I begin with the full sample from the American Community Survey (henceforth ACS)
from the years 2000-2011. Data was downloaded from IPUMS USA thanks to Alexan-
der et al. (2010). Variable codes referenced in this appendix are those from IPUMS,
and in some instances may differ from the coding structure in the raw ACS data files.
After importing the sample, I first remove all observations reported as living in
group ”institutions” (332558 observations deleted) or ”other group quarters” (236691
observations deleted). Then, individuals over the age of 65 (3612641 observations
deleted) and under the age of 25 (8058616 observations deleted) are removed. To
remove any possible simultaneity in the effects of work and schooling on work pro-
ductivity, I remove all observations currently attending school (762624 observations
deleted). Those who report as having less than 9 years of education are also dropped
from the sample (549852 observations deleted).
Since the study focuses on the work income, those observations who were not
employed and currently working are removed from the sample, along with those em-
ployed by the armed forces (3563403 observations deleted). I then remove workers
who report as self-employed (1062678 observations deleted), unpaid family work-
ers (17634 observations deleted), and those who work for non-profit organizations
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(724216 observations deleted). To conform with previous studies, I focus solely on
full-time, full-year (FTFY) workers, thus I then remove individuals who work fewer
than 40 weeks per year (570795 observations deleted) or fewer than 30 hours in a
typical workweek (392305 observations deleted). Since veterans typically differ from
non-veterans in terms of unmeasured human capital and would thus likely violate
the model’s statistical assumptions, I remove all veterans from the sample (716000
observations deleted). Also excluded are 3603 remaining observations who report as
being employed outside the United States.
I then wish to remove those individuals who report wage income below the legal
threshold, as these observations are either miscoded or misreported in light of all
other restrictions.29 The following code is used to convert earnings to 2011 dollars,
then calculate hourly wages for each observation:
• replace incwage=incwage*cpi11
• gen ww=43.5*(wkswork2==4)+48.5*(wkswork2==5)+51*(wkswork2==6)
• gen totalhours=uhrswork*ww
• gen wage=incwage/totalhours
All observations reporting hourly wage income less than $5.75 (the lowest real mini-
mum wage in the sample period) are then removed from the sample (118583 obser-
vations deleted).
In the spirit of abiding by the unconfoundedness assumption required to interpret
my results, the next sample restriction seemed prudent. It is my opinion that there
are likely to be systematic differences in unmeasured human capital stocks among
different racial groups. To eliminate the possibility of this affecting my results, I
construct my sample using only white observations, dropping all individuals who
29In real terms, the lowest minimum wage in the sample time frame was in 2006 when the real
minimum wage (in 2011 dollars) was $5.75.
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report their race as non-white (956787 observations deleted). For similar reasons, I
also make a few sample restrictions based on occupation. These omissions are listed
here:
• Social, recreation, and religious workers: drop if occ1990>173 & occ1990<177
(27378 observations deleted)
• Supervisors and proprietors of sales jobs: drop if occ1990==243 (170155 obser-
vations deleted)
• Farm operators and managers: drop if occ1990>472 & occ1990<477 (4875 ob-
servations deleted)
The final sample restrictions are made to adhere to the model’s common support
requirement. Because the wage effects of federal employment are clearly not equal for
males and females, I conduct the analysis separately for each, meaning that I require
common support for both sexes rather than the sample as a whole. For each sex, I
calculate the ratio of workers in each education/experience/occupation group.30 If
there exists a federal or private skill group of either sex with no observations in the
comparable skill group in the opposite sector, all individuals in this skill group are
dropped from the sample. The (unsimplified) code for this restriction is as follows:
• bys sex sector: egen count ss=count(logwage)
• bys sex sector ed exp occ: egen count sseeo=count(logwage)
• gen w eeo=count sseeo/count ss
• gen weeo mg=w eeo if male==1 & sector==1
• gen weeo fg=w eeo if male==0 & sector==1
• gen weeo mp=w eeo if male==1 & sector==0
• gen weeo fp=w eeo if male==0 & sector==0
• bys ed exp occ: egen mg eeo=mean(weeo mg)
• bys ed exp occ: egen fg eeo=mean(weeo fg)
• bys ed exp occ: egen mp eeo=mean(weeo mp)
30I will henceforth refer to each education/experience/occupation grouping a ”skill group”.
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• bys ed exp occ: egen fp eeo=mean(weeo fp)
• gen fedw eeo m=mg eeo/mp eeo
• gen fedw eeo f=fg eeo/fp eeo
• gen priw eeo m=mp eeo/mg eeo
• gen priw eeo f=fp eeo/fg eeo
• drop if fedw eeo m==. (46703 observations deleted)
• drop if fedw eeo f==. (94345 observations deleted)
• drop if priw eeo m==.
• drop if priw eeo f==.
As is shown above, 46,703 males are dropped from the sample for common support
purposes, along with 94,345 females.
In sum, I begin with the entire ACS sample from the years 2000-2011, which in-
cludes a total of 26,075,611 observations. After all excluded observations are removed,
the final sample consists of 3,198,319 private sector observations (1,741,580 male and
1,456,739 female) and 128,297 federal sector observations (61,556 male and 66,741
female).
Variable creation
The paper focuses on three primary explanatory variables. Education is clearly de-
fined in the ACS. School dropouts are defined as all observations reporting fewer
than 12 years of education, or as having attended grade 12 but not having attained a
diploma. High school graduates include those individuals with a GED or alternative
credentials. The ”some college” category includes all workers who report attending
at some college, but have not attained a bachelor’s degree.31 The advanced degree
educational category includes all observations who report as having attended college
for 5 years or more, or have been granted a master’s, doctoral, or professional degree.
31This category includes workers who have been granted a 2 year associates degree of any kind.
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Experience categories account not only for potential workforce experience, but
also for estimated work intensity. Potential experience is calculated as:
• gen potexperience=age-18
• replace potexperience=age-20 if ed==2
• replace potexperience=age-21 if ed==3
• replace potexperience=age-22 if ed==4
• replace potexperience=age-25 if ed==5
where ed=1,2,3,4,5 corresponds to education categories HS dropout, HS graduate,
some college, bachelor’s degree, and advanced degree, respectively. Because workers
of different skill groups might accrue human capital at varying rates, I use March CPS
samples (years 2000-2013) to calculate the average total hours worked for workers
based on their birth cohort, education, and sex:
• gen birthyr=year-age
• drop if birthyr>1986
• gen cohort=1*(birthyr<1940)+2*(birthyr>1939 & birthyr<1945)
+3*(birthyr>1944 & birthyr<1950)+4*(birthyr>1949 & birthyr<1955)
+5*(birthyr>1954 & birthyr<1960)+6*(birthyr>1959 & birthyr<1965)
+7*(birthyr>1964 & birthyr<1970)+8*(birthyr>1969 & birthyr<1975)
+9*(birthyr>1974 & birthyr<1980)+10*(birthyr>1979)
• bys cohort ed fed: egen wksw=mean(wkswork1)
• bys cohort ed fed: egen hrsw=mean(uhrswork)
• gen totalhrs=wksw*hrsw
• replace totalhrs=totalhrs/2000
To construct experience categories, I merge the compressed CPS dataset with the
ACS microdata by cohort, education, and federal employment status. Experience is
then calculated as the product of potential experience and the work intensity variable
totalhrs. This variable is then converted into a categorical variable based partially
on the even distribution of observations in each category:
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• gen experience=potexperience*totalhrs
• gen exp=1*(experience<5)+2*(experience>5 & experience<10)+3*(experience>10
& experience<15)+4*(experience>15 & experience<20)+5*(experience>20
& experience<25)+6*(experience>25 & experience<30)+7*(experience>30 &
experience<35)+8*(experience>35)
Worker occupation was classified as closely as possible following the 1990 census
occupation classification system. Using occupational categories which are too wide
and inclusive would risk invalidating differential estimates because this would increase
the risk of systematic differences in job characteristics between federal and private
sector workers. However, using occupation categories which are too narrowly defined
would result in greater difficulty achieving common support and would likely mean
the elimination of many more observations from the sample. The following table
contains the precise occupational codes used to create the occupation variable in the
paper. Excluded occupational categories are listed above.
Estimation
Once the sample is created, estimation is relatively straightforward. The code sample
referenced above can be used to calculate the reweighting variables θ in the paper’s
empirical model.32 More precisely, to estimate the counterfactual wage density in
figure 2a, one needs only to estimate the wage density for males in the federal sector
with observations reweighted by the function priw eeo m (seen just above).
The process is almost the same when calculating nonparametric average treatment
effects. When evaluating τATT , I am simply recording the difference between the
average private wage and the average federal wage, where the private sector workforce
is reweighted such that it has the characteristics of the federal workforce, with which
32When all explanatory variables are accounted for, fedw eeo f is equivalent to θfed(X) in (16) if
we wish to measure the counterfactual wage density for females in federal work. Likewise θpri(X)
is equal to priw eeo f if we wish to analyze the federal wage gap for females using the private sector
as a base.
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Table A2.1: Categorization of occupational codes
Occupation Code
Managers occ1990<23
Accountants and auditors occ1990¿22 & occ1990<25
Analysts, HR, and labor relations occ1990>24 & occ1990<28
Inspectors and management support occ1990>27 & occ1990<40
Engineers and architects occ1990>42 & occ1990<60
Mathematical and computer scientists occ1990>60 & occ1990<69
Natural scientists occ1990>68 & occ1990<84
Health diagnosis and treatment occ1990>83 & occ1990<110
Teachers (primary and secondary) (occ1990>153 & occ1990<164)
*(ind1990!=850)
College and university instructors (occ1990>153 & occ1990<164)
*(ind1990==850)
Librarians, archivist and curators occ1990>163 & occ1990<166
Social scientists and planners occ1990>165 & occ1990<174
Lawyers and judges occ1990>177 & occ1990<180
Artists and entertainers occ1990>180 & occ1990<201
Health technicians and specialists occ1990>201 & occ1990<210
Science technicians occ1990>210 & occ1990<226
Software developers occ1990==229
Other operators and technicians occ1990>225 & occ1990<240
& occ1990!=229
Service sales representatives occ1990>243 & occ1990<257
Commodities sales representatives occ1990>257 & occ1990<300
Office supervisors and equip. operators occ1990>302 & occ1990<309
Receptionists and typists occ1990>313 & occ1990<325
Secretaries occ1990==313
Records and financial clerks occ1990>325 & occ1990<345
Communication, mail, and message dist. occ1990>344 & occ1990<374
Adjusters and investigators occ1990>374 & occ1990<379
Miscellaneous administrative support occ1990>378 & occ1990<390
Police, fire, and protective services occ1990>410 & occ1990<428
Food preparation and services occ1990>428 & occ1990<445
Health service occupations occ1990>444 & occ1990<448
Building and personal services occ1990>447 & occ1990<470
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations occ1990>478 & occ1990<500
Automobile and electric mechanics occ1990>500 & occ1990<550
Construction workers occ1990>550 & occ1990<600
Extractive occupations occ1990>600 & occ1990<620
Precision production workers occ1990>620 & occ1990<700
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Machine operators occ1990>700 & occ1990<780
Welders and hand-assembly occupations occ1990>780 & occ1990<800
Transportation and mat. moving occs. occ1990>800 & occ1990<860
Helpers and other laborers n.e.c. occ1990>860 & occ1990<900
+ occ1990==405
it is being compared. For example, to calculate τATT for female private sector workers,
one would use the following code:
• sum logwage if male==0 & sector==1
• global i=r(mean)
• sum logwage if male==0 & sector==0 [aw=fedw eeo f]
• global j=r(mean)
• global ATT=$i-$j
• di $ATT
Linear treatment effect estimates are obtained using the oaxaca package, where τATT
is equivalent to the ”unexplained” portion of the measured mean wage gap. Linear
wage equations are estimated using dummy variables for education, experience, and
occupation, and do not include interaction terms.
The information provided in this appendix should be adequate to properly re-
construct the dataset and produce the empirical results in the paper. If anyone
attempting this task is having difficulty, please feel free to contact me.
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A New Perspective on the Male-Female
Wage Differential
Eric Makela
July 2014
Abstract
The vast empirical literature on male/female wage differentials reflects ex-
treme interest in the subject. However, the majority of empirical studies have
used Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition techniques which assume a priori knowl-
edge of the wage equation’s functional form. This paper utilizes a generalized
form of the popular Blinder-Oaxaca model to investigate how differences in
compensation affect the overall distribution of female earnings. Data shows
that much of the difference between male and female wage densities would be
eliminated in the absence of differential wage rates. The proposed model esti-
mates that the average female in the private sector is paid a wage approximately
21.4 percent lower than the average male salary after controlling for observable
differences in human capital. Differences in differential estimates between the
generalized and linear B-O models are also compared, and suggest that errors
of functional form may be present in linear specifications.
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1 Introduction
Differences in earnings between men and women are a subject of interest to economists
and policymakers alike. Although empirical research has documented the relative
gains achieved by women in the labor market over recent decades, unexplained wage
differences persist.
Review of the literature reveals two primary shortcomings. First, an overwhelm-
ing majority of empirical studies focus on simple mean effects, failing to account
for the distributional effects of human capital and gender. Second, among studies
attempting to identify wage gaps along the distribution of wages, strong functional
form assumptions have been used. The primary focus of this paper is to provide a
clear analysis of the effects of both human capital and skill price differences on the
distribution of male and female earnings and, subsequently, the male-female wage
gap. The model proposed here is comparable to those used in previous studies in
that both techniques identify the effects of gender on earnings for the average worker
in a population. However, the proposed empirical method differs substantially from
previous methods in that it allows estimation of the effects of conditional wages and
human capital on the distribution of earnings for an entire population, all without a
priori specification of a functional form of the wage equation.
Results confirm the existence of differential compensation practices between men
and women. In the private sector, the average female receives a wage penalty of ap-
proximately 21.4 percent. In a labor market in which all workers were paid as if they
were males, the female earnings density is estimated to shift rightward, eliminating a
majority of the raw wage gap and increasing the mass of women in the upper tail of the
earnings density. The proposed nonparametric model estimates smaller gender wage
differentials than a linear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition utilizing the same explana-
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tory variables, suggesting possible functional misspecification of the wage equation.1
Results from three differential estimation methods are then compared, and hint that
nonparametric models should be utilized when data allow.
The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections outline relevant empirical
studies and provide a thorough description of the data. Section four highlights the
empirical model used in estimation, and presents the quantitative and qualitative
results. Section five concludes.
2 Background
This paper builds on the litany of empirical work on gender wage differentials. Very
generally, the function
wi = f(Xi)
is used to represent the relationship between an individual’s wages wi and the charac-
teristics Xi which affect how productive that individual is. Under the human capital
theory, any estimated gap in earnings between males and females after controlling for
productive assets is generally interpreted as the effect of gender, or of discrimination
on the basis of gender. An interpretation of gender wage gaps under the efficiency
wage theory might suggest that, for any reason, firm-specific human capital is more
valuable to men than for women, and that higher wage rates for males are paid to
encourage greater attachment to the firm. Measurement of wage gaps has also been
attributed to various errors in the empirical process. Rapaport (1995) states that if
systematic measurement error exists between the two sexes, wage differentials might
appear in the data when in reality none exists. She also notes that proxy error may
1If this misspecification is systematic over all past studies using the linear Blinder-Oaxaca tech-
nique, it is possible that all the previous literature on the subject of male/female wage differentials
has overestimated the true unexplained wage gap.
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cause incorrect measures of wage gaps. For example, if male lawyers generally attend
more prestigious law schools than female lawyers and quality of the school is not
measured in microdata, a wage gap between men and women will be measured even
though it might be accounted for by superior data. For generality’s sake, I approach
the problem of gender wage differentials agnostic to the specific mechanism through
which the wage gaps arise; I will later discuss various interpretations of my results.
Empirical work on gender wage gaps2 builds primarily upon the basic decomposi-
tion techniques introduced by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Baker et al. (1995)
make an important observation of early empirical results, noting that the choice of
sample, analytical methodology and explanatory variables appear to be important
determinants of the estimated magnitude of the gender wage gap. Inconsistencies
in sample and methodology render many results incomparable, another facet of the
current literature which has influenced this paper.
While the majority of empirical studies focus on mean effects or gender wage gaps
in narrowly defined skill groups, a select few researchers have focused explicitly on the
distribution of the male-female wage differential. In their empirical analysis, Baker
et al. (1995) employ quantile regression to estimate the gender earnings gap at various
points in the overall distribution of earnings. Although they do not control for other
observable characteristics in the analysis, they are unable to document significant
differences in the gender wage gap between the 10th and 90th percentiles, but based
on decompositions within skill groups conclude that the gender wage gap is larger for
highly-skilled women in Canada.
In a more recent study, Boudarbat and Connolly (2013) use quantile decomposi-
tion techniques developed by Firpo et al. (2009) to decompose gender wage gaps along
2See Filer (1985), Gronau (1988), Groshen (1991), Lazear and Rosen (1990), Wood et al. (1993),
Blau and Kahn (1997), Hellerstein et al. (2002), Fortin (2008), Galego and Pereira (2010), and
Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010) for a small sample.
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the overall distribution of wages. The study finds similar results to those of Baker
et al. (1995), suggesting that highly educated females in the Canadian workforce face
the largest gender wage gap while those at the bottom of the earnings distribution
suffer least from discriminatory pay practices. Although the study is restricted to
only those individuals who are college graduates, the authors conclude that univer-
sity graduates are the driving force behind the widening male-female earnings gap.
The few studies focused on the distribution of the gender earnings gap are able
to make inference only when relatively restrictive statistical assumptions are used.3
More specifically, past results can only be interpreted as valid when the wage equation
is correctly specified. Herein lies a primary fault with the existing literature: all past
studies, to my knowledge,4 have assumed a linear functional form of the wage equa-
tion. If the relationship between earnings and personal characteristics is not linear,
past results have may be biased due to specification error, although the direction of
this bias is not entirely clear.
This study is similar in spirit to Baker et al. (1995) and Boudarbat and Connolly
(2013) in that it attempts to identify the effects of gender on the entire wage distri-
bution. Rather than assuming a priori knowledge of the wage equation’s functional
form however, I adopt nonparametric techniques developed by DiNardo et al. (1996)
to assess the gender wage gap both quantitatively and qualitatively. The empirical
results presented here are the first nonparametric estimates of the gender wage gap,
and thus represent a marked improvement over previous studies in terms of model
pliability and required statistical assumptions.
3Also, to my knowledge, no studies have performed such an analysis using data from the United
States.
4Perhaps with the exception of Rapaport (1995), who estimates one fully nonparametric speci-
fication. She finds that race and gender are still estimated to have a significant effect on teachers’
earnings, results which closely mirror those obtained by her parametric specifications.
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3 Data
Data used in the analysis are from the American Community Survey, years 2000-2011.
The primary advantage of this data source is the large sample size, a data character-
istic required in order to relax the functional form assumptions of past studies. The
study is restricted to individuals aged 25 to 65 who have completed at least nine years
of education, were working at the time of the survey, and were not enrolled in school.
The sample also excludes employees who have worked fewer than 40 weeks over the
past year, who report working fewer than 30 hours in a typical workweek, who work
for nonprofit organizations, or who are identified as self-employed.5 Also excluded
from the dataset are 10,333 observations who are not matched with either male or
female counterparts. Importantly, the study is limited to “white” individuals. By
focusing on a single racial demographic, I eliminate the possibility that the results
are biased in either direction by unobservable characteristics which are heterogeneous
across racial backgrounds.6
The study focuses on three human capital variables: education, experience, and
occupation. All variables used in the paper are defined explicitly in the variable
creation section of Appendix B, where the precise coding for the education and oc-
cupation variables can be viewed. Each individual’s experience is calculated as the
product of potential workforce experience and a work intensity variable. Potential
workforce experience is equal to an observation’s age minus 18 minus a constant which
varies depending on educational attainment.7 Work intensity is calculated from a CPS
5Also, the sample excludes military personnel and individuals living in institutions or other
group quarters. Self-employed workers are also omitted from the sample. Observations reporting
wage income less than $5.75 per hour worked are excluded, as these must be mistakenly coded in
light of other restrictions.
6See Appendix B for a step-by-step list of casewise exclusions.
7Potential experience is calculated separately for each observation. For high school dropouts,
potential experience = age-18. For high school graduates, potential experience = age-20. For those
with some college, potential experience = age-21. For workers with a Bachelor’s degree, potential
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sample separately by education and birth cohort as the average number of total hours
worked per year divided by 2000.8
The intent of creating experience variables in such a way is to account for differ-
ences in experience accumulation due to differential labor supply decisions between
men and women and among birth cohorts. Males typically work more hours in the
paid workforce per year than females and would thus gain experience at a faster rate;
the work intensity variable is intended to account for these difference. The result is
that although women in the sample are on average older than men (44.7 years versus
42.7), calculated average workforce experience is very similar (24.7 years for women
versus 24.5 years for men). Although I am unable to perfectly control for workforce
experience using a large, cross-sectional dataset, I believe experience, as calculated
here, effectively controls for differences in human capital stock arising from differential
labor supply patterns.9
Earned income is the primary variable of interest in the paper. Table 1 shows that
average yearly earnings for males are over $23,000 greater than that of females, and
are also more dispersed than female earnings. On average, however, females in the
sample work fewer weeks per year and fewer hours per workweek, thus comparison of
yearly earnings is likely to be confounded by differences in the labor supply decision
between men and women. To counter this effect, I use hourly wages as my measure of
earned income. Hourly wages are computed using work information reported to the
census bureau.10 Even after accounting for differences in usual time worked, a large
experience = age-22. For those with an advanced or professional degree, potential experience =
age-25.
8See Appendix B for exact details and justification of created variables.
9Treatment effects were also calculated using the “potential experience” variable as the individ-
ual’s measure of workforce experience. When work intensity is included in the experience variable
creation, the estimated wage effects of gender were slightly closer to those measured in previous
literature, although the change was not large in significance.
10More precisely, the ACS provides researchers with total earned income, a continuous variable
of usual hours worked in a week, and a categorical variable indicating the number of weeks worked
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the workforce by sex, 2000-2011
Variable Male Female
Mean yearly earnings (2011 $) 71,289 47,936
Mean hourly wage (2011 $) 30.89 22.69
Std. dev. of hourly wage (2011 $) 26.34 16.72
Public 16.05 25.20
Education
HS Dropout 6.23 3.43
HS Graduate 28.85 27.62
Some college 28.04 33.95
Bachelor’s degree 24.17 21.90
Advanced degree 12.70 13.10
Experience
0-10 years 13.12 13.64
11-15 years 11.59 10.19
15-19 years 12.26 11.37
20-24 years 13.21 12.97
25-29 years 14.39 14.61
30-34 years 14.62 16.24
35-39 years 11.82 12.57
40+ years 9.00 8.42
Observations 2,179,783 2,004,101
Table 1: Dollar figures are converted to 2011 dollars using the CPI. Public employees
include local, state, and federal workers.
earnings gap exists between the two groups; males earn an estimated hourly wage
of $30.89 while females earn an average of only $22.69 per hour of work, an average
wage premium equal to 26.5 percent of the average male wage.
The demographic composition of the sample, as shown in table 1, does not easily
lend itself to a story of persistent negative female earnings gaps, thus a simple exami-
nation of mean earnings does little to identify the source of differential wages between
men and women. In particular, it has been shown in the literature that females in
in the past year. Number of weeks worked is imputed using the midpoint of each category as such:
Wks.Worked = 43.5 ∗ (40 ≤ weeks ≤ 47) + 48.5 ∗ (48 ≤ weeks ≤ 49) + 51 ∗ (50 ≤ weeks ≤ 52).
Hourly wages are then calculated by dividing total wage income by the imputed total number of
hours worked in the last year. See Appendix B for detailed summaries of variable construction.
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different skill groups will not face the same gender wage gap, suggesting heterogeneity
in the effects of gender.11 This heterogeneity is documented in table 2, which displays
the mean female wage gap for each education/experience group in the sample. The
data support the findings of past research measuring smaller gender wage gaps for
public employees than private sector workers.12 Among the youngest cohort of gov-
ernment workers with greater than a bachelor’s degree, the mean hourly wage gap is
approximately 2.4 percent. The most highly educated and highly experienced female
skill group faces an estimated mean wage penalty of nearly 50 percent in the private
sector.
Similar heterogeneity is observed in appendix tables A.1 and A.2 where I examine
mean gender wage gaps by occupational category. On average, women receive a
wage penalty of approximately 28.7 percent in the private sector and 20.7 percent
in the public sector. Wage gaps in the private labor market range from 1.8 percent
for workers in resource extraction occupations to 51.1 percent in health treatment
categories. In every private sector occupation category, mean wages for women are
below average male wages. In the public sector, females in technical operation jobs
receive a wage penalty of around 44.7 percent, while those in farming and similar
occupations actually receive a wage premium of about 1 percent.
Results in tables 2, A.1 and A.2 document a noticeable lack of homogeneity in the
effects of gender on earnings when controlling for various measures of human capi-
tal. Among education groupings, the earnings gap is lowest among young workers,
and generally rises with potential workforce experience. Within experience cohorts,
gender wage gaps seem to rise with educational attainment for private sector work-
ers and fall with educational attainment in the public sector. Both patterns suggest
11See Lazear and Rosen (1990) and Baker et al. (1995).
12See Wood et al. (1993) and Baro´n and Cobb-Clark (2010) for examples.
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Table 2: Female log wage premiums, by education and experience
Experience HS Dropout HS Grad. Some College Bach. Deg. Adv. Deg.
A) Private sector only
0-10 yrs -0.201 -0.177 -0.140 -0.113 -0.133
11-15 yrs -0.225 -0.214 -0.191 -0.151 -0.210
15-19 yrs -0.250 -0.244 -0.231 -0.228 -0.271
20-24 yrs -0.298 -0.277 -0.254 -0.288 -0.331
25-29 yrs -0.331 -0.301 -0.282 -0.334 -0.382
30-34 yrs -0.339 -0.317 -0.294 -0.386 -0.431
35-39 yrs -0.332 -0.323 -0.287 -0.392 -0.483
40+ yrs -0.327 -0.296 -0.276 -0.387 -0.496
B) Public sector only
0-10 yrs -0.119 -0.178 -0.229 -0.100 -0.024
11-15 yrs -0.225 -0.216 -0.267 -0.141 -0.092
15-19 yrs -0.248 -0.274 -0.312 -0.200 -0.138
20-24 yrs -0.309 -0.282 -0.344 -0.256 -0.165
25-29 yrs -0.314 -0.286 -0.332 -0.268 -0.188
30-34 yrs -0.256 -0.270 -0.303 -0.258 -0.191
35-39 yrs -0.283 -0.257 -0.282 -0.248 -0.197
40+ yrs -0.269 -0.218 -0.228 -0.223 -0.244
Table 2: Coefficient estimates are the result of regressions of log wages on a female
dummy variable for each education/experience/sector category. All coefficients are
significant at the 1% level.
likely heterogeneity in the effects of gender on individual wages. Further, the vari-
ety of coefficient magnitudes signal that the wage effects of being female are more
complicated than the simple linear shift in the earnings profile suggested by previ-
ous research. These facts suggest that differential estimation using a simple dummy
variable for gender will lead to biased results and improper inference. The method
proposed in this paper allows for heterogeneity in gender’s wage effects and will thus
not introduce bias into wage gap estimates.
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4 Methodology and results
While summary statistics have provided some evidence for the existence of gender
earnings gaps, a simple comparison of mean earnings leaves many interesting ques-
tions unanswered. Adopting the methodology proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) and
detailed by Fortin et al. (2011), the remainder of this paper is dedicated to investigat-
ing the effects of human capital and differential pay practices on the distribution of
female earnings. The proposed model requires only minimal statistical assumptions,
offering a specification error-free alternative to past empirical models.
The attractive properties of this approach are twofold. First, by eliminating
parametric assumptions, I eliminate any potential bias due to specification error in
the wage equation. Although past studies generally include robustness checks, most
economists will likely agree that the true relationship between wages and productive
characteristics is unknown. Although the rationale for adopting the linear functional
form is not given in most studies, I expect it is likely used as a “best guess” approxi-
mation due to its desirable small-sample properties and the ability to compare results
with those of previous studies.
Secondly, the approach allows study of the distributional effects of human capital
and conditional wages, rather than the simple mean effects obtained by most previous
research.13 In fact, the proposed model can be adapted to obtain measures of the
male-female wage gap at any point along the distribution of earnings, allowing past
results to be compared with estimates of the mean effect of the nonparametric model.
The model’s pliability allows study of the effects of gender on earnings along the entire
wage distribution, and offers an important methodological update of the existing
literature.
13See Baker et al. (1995), Baro´n and Cobb-Clark (2010), and Boudarbat and Connolly (2013) for
noteworthy exceptions.
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4.1 Kernel density estimation
In order to qualitatively assess the distributional effects of gender-specific wage rates
on the distribution of earnings, I must first establish a reliable method to estimate
wage densities. Allow gˆ(w0s) to represent the empirical density estimate for sex s at
hourly wage w0. The earnings density is estimated by the kernel function
gˆ(w0s) =
θi
h
n∑
i=1
K
(
Wis − w0s
h
)
, (1)
where h is the bandwidth and g is the univariate density of wages. The θi above
are observation-specific weights, which depend on w0s and the type of kernel function
used in estimation.
An important consideration in kernel density estimation is the choice of band-
width. Although the dataset is not lacking in observations, a proper bandwidth is
needed to maintain balance between bias and variance in the density estimates. Large
bandwidths result in kernel estimates with low variance and high bias; selection of a
small bandwidth will reduce the bias at the expense of higher variance. To select the
bandwidth for each density estimate, this paper utilizes the plug-in technique pro-
posed by Sheather and Jones (1991). Also relevant is the choice of kernel function.
The Epanechnikov kernel is used here, although tests of alternative kernel functions
suggest this issue is of little empirical importance in this instance.
Kernel density estimates of male and female earnings in both the public and
private sectors are displayed in figure 1. Vertical lines represent mean hourly log
earnings for each sex. Male wage densities lie distinctly above the female densities in
both sectors. There appears to be greater mass on the lower end of the female wage
density for private workers, resulting in the noticeably large mean gap in earnings in
this sector. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution gives
an estimated p-value of 0.000 in both sectors, suggesting that male and female hourly
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Figure 1: Male and Female Earnings Densities, by Sector
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Figure 1: Total hours worked are calculated as the imputed value of weeks worked
last year times usual number of hours worked per week. Hourly wages are then equal
to total wage income divided by total hours worked.
wages would be unlikely to be drawn from the same distribution if wage rates were
indeed random variables.14 Similarly, a two-sample t-test rejects the null hypothesis
that mean wages for men and women are equal.15
14Figure A.1 shows the male and female wage densities when public and private sector workers are
combined. The qualitative results are similar, and a Kolmogorow-Smirnov test on these estimates
again produces a p-value of 0.000.
15Tests were conducted for public employees, private employees, and a pooled sample of both
groups. In each case, H0 is rejected at the 1% significance level.
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4.2 Empirical approach
“How would the earnings of males and females compare if both sexes were truly
compensated equally?” This general question is the heart of most studies of the male-
female wage differential, and is central in the current paper. In a general sense, I
wish to compare the labor market outcomes of men and women. Specifically, I will
estimate the density of earnings that would result if females were paid as if they were
males, as well as the average effect being female on one’s earnings after controlling
for productive characteristics.
Denote the expected earnings of females and males respectively as Ef (w) and
Em(w). In a simple context, mean, or expected earnings of females, is
Ef (w) =
J∑
j=1
pij,femalewj,female, (2)
where wj,female is the mean earnings of women in skill group j and pij,female is the
fraction of women in skill group j. Clearly, expected earnings for women depend
not only on conditional earnings w but also on the number of women who have
chosen to be a part of skill group j. It is therefore possible that the raw earnings
gaps presented in the previous section are a function of pi rather than differences in
conditional earnings between men and women.
To investigate this possibility, a set of counterfactual earnings for women must
be estimated. Obtaining this counterfactual is rather straightforward. Denote this
estimate as
Emf (w) =
J∑
j=1
pij,femalewj,male, (3)
where subscripts denote the population from which characteristic weights pi are taken
and superscripts denote the population from which wages are taken. Thus (3) is an
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estimate of the mean earnings of females if they were paid male wages.16
While the reweighting method described above might be used to analyze differ-
ences in earnings between the average female and the average male, it is possible to
generalize it to study the effects of gender on wages in the population as a whole.
Define the distribution of earnings for females to be
ff (w) =
∫
hf (w|X)g(X|f)dX, (4)
where hf (w|X) is the female conditional wage function and g(X|f) denotes the dis-
tribution of productive characteristics X for females. To assess the impact of wage
rates on the observed distribution of earnings, we can imagine replacing female wages
with male wages in the above equation, thus yielding
fmf (w) =
∫
hm(w|X)g(X|f)dX, (5)
which is simply (4) with the conditional wage function for males substituted in for
that of females.
Equation (5) may be estimated indirectly by reweighting (4) such that the pop-
ulation of interest is given male characteristics and female wages. (5) can thus be
rewritten as
fmf (w) =
∫
hm(w|X)g(X|m)θf (X)dX, (6)
which is the male wage distribution reweighted such that the sample has the charac-
teristics of females. In the above equation, weight function
θf (X) =
g(X|f)
g(X|m) , (7)
thus (6) simplifies to (5).
16Alternatively, one might estimate Efm(w) =
J∑
j=1
pij,malewj,female, which is simply average male
earnings if men were paid according to the female wage scale.
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In this paper, reweighting function θf (X) is estimated by taking the proportion
of women with exact characteristics X and dividing by the proportion of men with
the same characteristics.17 For example, table A.1 shows that in the private sector,
women are less likely than men to be employed as managers. Because the fraction of
men who are managers is greater than the fraction of female managers, θf (X) < 1,
thus each male manager in the estimate of (6) will receive less weight than in the ac-
tual male wage distribution if occupation was the only characteristic variable in the
vector X. Likewise, females are more likely than males to be employed in a health
diagnosis occupation, thus each male will receive a weight greater than 1 when esti-
mating counterfactual (6). Throughout the remainder of the paper, counterfactual
estimates are obtained using the nonparametric method outlined above. Counterfac-
tual wage densities obtained by (6) are interpreted as the female wage density that
would be observed if females were paid male wages, assuming the female characteristic
distribution is unaffected by changes in the wage structure.
Note that this reweighting process is similar in spirit to that of estimating treat-
ment effects in the program evaluation literature. By comparing the mean wage of
the counterfactual wage density described above with the mean wage of the observed
female wage density, I am able to obtain an estimate of the average treatment effect
on the treated. Further, by comparing the nonparametric ATT estimates with linear
Blinder-Oaxaca estimates of the ATT, I am able to test for potential bias caused by
specification error of the linear wage equations.
17θ may also be estimated using any standard probability model. Rosenbaum (1987) notes that
estimating propensity scores by parametric specification results in superior estimates in some cases,
as these model-based estimates “compensate to some degree for the difference between the population
and actual sample proportions... thereby correcting for both systematic and chance imbalances.”
My paper abstracts from this issue to focus solely on the benefits full nonparametric specification
as opposed to linear shifts in wage profiles in estimation of gender wage differentials.
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4.3 Counterfactual wage densities
I begin the empirical portion of the paper by offering a more qualitative view of the
effects of differential wage rates between sexes. Generally speaking, the nonparametric
reweighting method outlined above is ideal for differential analysis because it not only
allows researchers to identify mean effects, but also reflects changes would occur in
the earnings distribution as a whole if male and female conditional wage functions
were the same. It should also be noted that although this study focuses on average
treatment effects as the quantitative measure of the real wage gap, it is possible to
modify this pliable methodology slightly to estimate real wage gaps at any set of
points along the male and female wage distributions.18
The question at the heart of the discussion of gender wage gaps is the extent to
which differential compensation practices are the driving force behind observed wage
differentials. Thus I am interested in the portion of the male-female wage gap which
is not due to differences in observable productive characteristics, or more precisely,
the effect of differential conditional wage functions. Note that to properly assess this
statistic the two groups must have equal sets of characteristics. Qualitatively, the
effect of differential CWFs can be seen by comparing the wage density estimated by
(4) with the wage density estimated by (5).
These empirical estimates are relatively easy to obtain. The empirical version
of (4) is simply the unweighted kernel density estimate (1). Counterfactual density
(5) is also obtained via the kernel density estimator. The empirical version of (5)
is estimated as the kernel density estimate of male wages, with observations each
receiving analytical weight (7). The result is that counterfactual (5) simulates what
the female wage density would be if they each received the average wages of men in
18For a short discussion, see Butcher and DiNardo (2002); see Gregory and Borland (1999) for
general information on the reweighting method.
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Figure 2: Estimates of female wage densities given male wages, private sector
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Figure 2: Differences between the female and counterfactual wage densities are inter-
preted as the effect of differential compensation practices between men and women.
Gaps between the male and counterfactual wage densities can be interpreted as a mea-
sure of the raw wage gap that can be explained by differences in observable human
capital attributes.
their respective skill groups.
Figure 2 demonstrates the effects of differential wage rates on the observed female
earnings distribution. Figure 2a shows the observed male and female wage densities
for private sector workers; again, vertical lines mark the mean earnings for each popu-
lation. Other subfigures present counterfactual estimates of what the female earnings
density would be if women were paid wages equal to that of comparable males in the
sample, controlling for different sets of human capital variables. Accounting only for
differences in education, the estimated counterfactual appears very similar to that of
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the observed male wage density. Interpretation of figure 2b is relatively simple. If
males and females in the private sector had equal distributions of educational attain-
ment and were paid equal wages, their earnings densities would be almost identical
and mean log hourly wages for females would be approximately 2 percent lower than
that of males (3.21 vs 3.19 in figures 2a and 2b). The addition of experience to ex-
planatory vector X appears to have a small effect on the estimated counterfactual,
suggesting that differential experience has little influence on gender wage gaps.
Of the variables of interest, occupation is possibly the characteristic which is most
responsible for the defining differences between male and female wage densities. The
addition of occupation to the calculation of θ(X) shifts greater mass into the lower
portion of the counterfactual wage density and lowers estimated mean log hourly
earnings to 3.13. This leftward shift of the counterfactual density means that control-
ling for occupation results in the portion of the raw wage gap explained by personal
characteristics to be smaller, suggesting that females are more likely to be employed
in generally lower-paying occupations.
Figure 3 displays a similar pattern of male-female wage differences occurring in
the public sector. Accounting only for differences in education, the estimated mean
wage gap falls to only one percent under the counterfactual assumption that women
are paid like men. Figure 3c suggests that if education and experience were the only
factors which affected wage rates, the female earnings density would lie slightly above
that of males and average female wages would be one percent higher than average
male wages. As with the private sector estimates, the inclusion of occupation in
the counterfactual calculation lowers the mean wage and shifts the estimated wage
density to the left, again promoting the notion that females in the public sector tend to
occupy comparatively lower-paying positions than men with otherwise similar human
capital.
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Figure 3: Estimates of female wage densities given male wages, public sector
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Figure 3: Differences between the female and counterfactual wage densities are inter-
preted as the effect of differential compensation practices between men and women.
Gaps between the male and counterfactual wage densities can be interpreted as a mea-
sure of the raw wage gap that can be explained by differences in observable human
capital attributes.
The nonparametric reweighting process just demonstrated is elegant in its sim-
plicity. Without even quantitatively measuring treatment effects, it has been shown
that when both sexes receive the same conditional wage function, the simulated fe-
male earnings density would much more closely mirror the male earnings density.
The model also allows me to inspect the potential importance of personal character-
istics on the wage gap by including/excluding them from the calculation of individual
weights θ(X). Omitting a variable in the weight estimation process is analogous
to excluding that variable from the wage equation in linear Blinder-Oaxaca models.
95
From this omission process, it appears that occupational preference is the primary
human capital determinant of gender wage gaps.
4.4 Estimated treatment effects
Abstracting momentarily from discussion of wage densities as a whole, I shift my
attention to measures of the mean effect of gender on earnings. The reweighting
approach demonstrated above has many applications in the program evaluation lit-
erature, and the following discussion adopts similar terminology. Throughout this
section, females will be considered the treatment group and males are the control
group. Treatment effects are calculated by measuring the impact on wages while
keeping workforce characteristics constant. Let
Q(X) = Ef (w|X)− Em(w|X), (8)
thus Q(X) is the wage differential between females and males conditional on charac-
teristics X. Also allow g(X|S) to be the distribution of characteristics for sex S.19
The average treatment effect on the treated is then estimated as
τATT = E(w(female)|S = 1)− E(w(male)|S = 1) (9)
=
∫
Q(X)g(X|S = 1)dX.
The female composition of characteristics is thus used to estimate a weighted mean
treatment effect. Interpretation of (8) is as above: If both sexes were given charac-
teristics equal to those of females, τATT measures the wage advantage (or penalty)
realized by the average member of the female workforce, or the effect of gender on
the average female’s earnings.
This nonparametric static is comparable to the “unexplained” portion of the raw
wage gap in the well-known linear version of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in
19S = 1 denotes the female population while S = 0 represents males.
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Table 3: Estimates of ATT from linear and nonparametric models
Private Public
Model τATT
100× τATT
−0.287 τATT
100× τATT
−0.207
Raw differential = -0.287 Raw differential = -0.207
Controls for education, experience, occupation
Linear B-O -0.230 80.1 -0.154 74.4
(0.005) - (0.005) -
Nonparametric -0.214 74.6 -0.147 71.0
(0.004) - (0.004) -
Controls for education, experience
Linear B-O -0.266 92.7 -0.230 111.1
(0.006) - (0.005) -
Nonparametric -0.263 91.6 -0.225 108.7
(0.006) - (0.004) -
Controls for education
Linear B-O -0.266 92.7 -0.227 109.7
(0.006) - (0.004) -
Nonparametric -0.266 92.7 -0.227 109.7
(0.006) - (0.004) -
Table 3: Percent columns refer to the portion of the raw earnings differential
attributed to treatment effects. Linear B-O decomposition models include non-
interacted dummies for the indicated control variables. Nonparametric treatment
effects are estimated as specified above.
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the sense that both measure the portion of the gap attributable to differences in
skill prices. In the case where the linear model contains full interaction terms for
all explanatory variables, both linear and generalized models will produce fully non-
parametric estimates of τATT . I test the effects of linear parametric specification of
the wage equation by estimating τATT using two specifications: one with a simple
set of dummy variables for each explanatory variable and one fully nonparametric
with a full complement of interaction terms. To calculate standard errors, a simple
bootstrap was used. Statistics were calculated in 1000 repetitions of sample size N
drawn with replacement, then bootstrapped standard errors were derived from the
results.
Estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated are presented in table 3.
The nonparametric method estimates the average private sector female receives an
hourly log wage penalty of 0.214. This unexplained earnings gap is seen in figure 2d,
and simply measures the distance between means of the female and counterfactual
wage densities.20 Using the same sample, the linear B-O decomposition estimates the
average female faces a wage gap of 0.230. Women in the public workforce receive a
smaller wage penalty than those in the private sector, a finding consistent with the
previous literature. Again, the parametrically-specified B-O model estimates a larger
mean unexplained wage gap than the nonparametric model.
Removing occupation from the vector of explanatory variables raises private sector
estimates of τATT to 0.266 and 0.263 for the linear and nonparametric specifications,
respectively. Interpretation of the nonparametric result is also relatively simple: if
men had the same measurable education and experience as women (but still kept the
male occupation distribution), the average female would earn an hourly wage 26.3
20Mean log wages in figure 2d are rounded to the nearest hundredth, hence the average treatment
effect of 0.214 is rounded to 0.21 in the figure.
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percent lower than the average male wage. In the public sector, females have greater
measurable human capital than males, yet are still estimated to receive a 22.5 percent
hourly wage penalty. Removing experience from the set of controlled variables results
in little change in estimated treatment effects, although it is worth noting that the
fewer factors I control for in the model the larger the difference between estimates of
the parametric and nonparametric models.
Why exactly do the estimates from these two specifications differ? The answer lies
in the B-O linear functional form specification. Barsky et al. (2002) cites estimation
of counterfactuals as the key to bias hidden in linear B-O decompositions. While
least squares estimation minimizes mean square error for estimated male or female
wage regressions the MSE is not necessarily minimized when estimating counterfac-
tual wages for the opposite group. As a result, these models will either under- or
overestimate what true wages would be in the counterfactual scenario, attributing
either too much or too little of the mean wage gap to differences in conditional wage
functions between genders. In contrast, nonparametric methods avoid specification
of a functional form, and thus will not introduce potential bias due to errors in func-
tional form. Thus the nonparametric specification, which Barsky et al. (2002) term
the Generalized Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition, will produce more unbiased estimates
of the effects of gender on earnings and the female wage gap.
4.5 Differential profile estimates
While a comparison of average treatment effects may shed some light on possible
bias arising from the functional form assumptions of past Blinder-Oaxaca studies of
the gender wage gap, it may not tell the whole story. Indeed in its most simple
form (without use of multiple interaction terms between human capital variables),
the linear version of B-O assumes that experience, or age, affects wage rates in a way
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common to all skill groups. Thus regardless of a female’s education or occupational
choice, her wages relative to that of men are assumed to follow a given path as she
ages.21 In this section I test the validity of this assumption by comparing experience
profile estimates from the nonparametric and linear decomposition models, as well
as estimates gleaned from a wage equation using a female dummy variable. First,
gender wage differentials were estimated using three models: the two decompositions
utilized in the previous section and a dummy variable model.22 Next, I find the mean
of the differential estimates for each education/age/occupation/sector group. I am
then able to map differential profiles for every age, for each skill group.
I begin by examining wage differential estimates for highly educated workers in
health treatment occupations. For this skill group in the private sector, average male
wages are over 50 percent higher than average female wages even though women are
much more likely to choose this particular occupation (see appendix table A.1). As
can be seen in figure 4, women of all ages are estimated to face differential wages from
that of comparable males in the private sector. In the public sector, the youngest
cohort of women are estimated to receive a wage premium of over 20 percent in the
nonparametric model and a wage penalty of almost 20 percent in the linear decom-
position model. Such differences in wage gap estimates must be attributed to the
functional form assumptions underlying the linear B-O method.
Also of note are differences in the differential age profiles between the three models.
While the dummy method provides an estimate of the average effect of sex on wages,
21Even if some interaction terms are used in the estimation, bias may still persist unless all
explanatory variables are fully interacted with each other. In this case, estimates of the wage gap
will yield identical results as the nonparametric model.
22The dummy variable differential is obtained by regressing hourly log wages on a female dummy
variable. As previously, the linear B-O specification includes single dummy variables, one for each
education, experience, and occupation category, while the nonparametric specification includes full
interaction terms in addition to these. High school dropouts with 0-10 years of experience and who
work in management are the base group for all decompositions.
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Figure 4: Gender wage gaps, health diagnosis and treatment occupations
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Figure 4: Gender wage gaps are estimated separately by sector. Dummy variable
estimates are obtained by regressing log wages on a female dummy variable separately
for each sector.
interpretation of this statistic at any single level of experience (or age) is likely to
be invalid. For young cohorts, the dummy variable approach tends to overestimate
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Figure 5: Gender wage gaps, education occupations
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Figure 5: Gender wage gaps are estimated separately by sector. Dummy variable
estimates are obtained by regressing log wages on a female dummy variable separately
for each sector.
the true wage gap while underestimating the wage gap faced by more experienced
women. Likewise, linear B-O estimates confront the same issue when compared to
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nonparametric estimates.
Next, I examine gender wage differentials for workers in education occupations,
an industry in which both men and women are highly represented. Figure 5 compares
the gender wage differential age profile for each model. Again, a simple comparison
of mean earnings in each sector (i.e. the dummy variable approach) is likely to yield
misleading information for this particular skill group. The estimated progression of
relative wages also differs between linear B-O and nonparametric models. For public
sector educators, the gap between differential estimates from these two specifications
is more than 0.1 for ages 43-65. In general, the nonparametric technique yields smaller
estimates of the gender wage gap. Because this model assumes nothing about the
relationship between wages and skills, it should be viewed as the most accurate as is
possible given the quality of the data.
Examination of differential experience profiles for other skill groups reveals similar
evidence and generally supports the hypothesis that parametric specification is likely
to lead to errors of functional form, although no formal hypothesis test is offered
here. For some skill groups, the linear specification does very well at matching the
nonparametric differential estimate. For other groups, the two models produce very
different estimates.
Two points should be gleaned from this exercise. First, nonparametric estimates
of the female wage gap document significant heterogeneity in the effects of sex and age
on wage rates. Not only does the simplistic dummy variable approach assume homo-
geneous effects, but also does a generally poor job of reflecting the actual differential
faced by large portions of the female workforce. Secondly, the linear Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition estimated here projects the gender wage differential to “progress”
equally throughout a worker’s lifetime regardless of other observable characteristics.
As the nonparametric estimates show, this is likely a poor assumption. Thus even
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if the linear B-O model represents a significant upgrade over the dummy variable
approach, it will also likely produce biased estimates of the mean wage gap.23
5 Conclusion
In terms of empirical techniques used to evaluate the male/female wage differential,
there has been little progress made in recent years. The overwhelming majority of
recent literature on the subject utilizes various forms of the linear Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition, focusing on the mean effects of gender on wage outcomes. In this
aspect, the generalized Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition proposed in this paper offers
a significant upgrade of past models because it allows researchers to estimate entire
counterfactual wage densities rather than focusing solely on expected wages in the
counterfactual setting. The potential benefits to this approach are clear and extend to
a wide variety of issues. For example, suppose government officials wished to assess
the impact of a policy on the wage rates of public employees. Given an adequate
number of observations in both the treatment and control groups, one could easily
estimate what the wage density of the affected workforce would be in the absence
of the policy, allowing focus on the group of public employees as a whole instead of
focusing on the policy’s impact on the average worker.
Another important update of the current literature is the absence of potential
specification error in nonparametric estimates of the gender wage gap. When all
covariates are accounted for, the generalized B-O model predicts that being female
lowers the wage of average women in the private sector by approximately 21.4 percent;
the mean gender effect for public sector women is -14.7 percent. The linear B-O model
predicts larger unexplained wage differentials than the generalized decomposition.
Because the same sample and covariates are used, we can attribute the difference in
23That is unless all explanatory variables are interacted with each other.
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estimates to specification error of the wage equation in the linear model. Thus when
the precise relationship between wages and personal characteristics is unknown, which
is likely the case in most studies, nonparametric estimation allows researchers to leave
the functional form of this relationship unspecified, eliminating possible biased results
due to misspecification.
While the potential benefits of the generalized approach are great, it would be
remiss to leave the costs unaddressed. The first issue is that of result interpreta-
tion. The aforementioned nonparametric results may be interpreted as an estimate
of wage discrimination if and only if all wage-determining variables are observed and
controlled for by the researcher. If this is not the case, we can attribute the mea-
sured wage gaps to everything other than those factors directly observed. Difficulty
in interpretation is also confounded by the second issue with nonparametric estima-
tion: data sufficiency. More precise interpretation typically requires researchers to
control for a greater number of personal characteristics. However, the addition of
explanatory variables creates problems of common support among the two sample
populations, and requires many more observations. Thus there is an inherent trade-
off between precise interpretation of results and increased data requirements. By
choosing to focus on only three explanatory variables, I hope to eliminate common
support issues as much as possible while being cautious when interpreting results.
In the current study, I believe the benefits to the nonparametric approach outweigh
the costs, although researchers with limited datasets should consider these carefully
before attempting nonparametric estimation.
Results of the nonparametric analysis imply that although differences in education,
experience, and occupation play a role in wage outcome differences between men
and women, other factors are surely at play. In particular, there is evidence to
suggest that differential conditional wage functions account for at least part of the
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noticeable difference between wage densities of males and females.24 Both qualitative
and quantitative results propose that of the human capital variables examined in the
paper, occupation plays the largest role in observed wage gaps. This result supports
previous research which suggests females generally receive lower pay because they
tend to choose relatively low-paying occupations.
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate differences in male and female
wage rates and their effect on observed earnings densities using a generalized Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition. Clearly, estimation shows that given male wage rates, the
wage density of females would shift significantly to the right, and much more closely
resemble that of males. The model’s pliability leaves many avenues of this issue open
for discovery, and suggests that improved methods of differential estimation, free of
specification error, are available to researchers with large datasets.
24I make this claim under the assumption that unobservable personal characteristics do not account
for all of the measured treatment effects.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Mean female wage gaps in the private sector, by occupation
Occupation Pct. males Pct. females w¯occf − w¯occm
Managers 15.07 11.50 -0.348
Accountants and auditors 1.68 3.15 -0.378
Analysts, HR, and labor relations 2.08 2.97 -0.393
Inspectors and management support 1.10 1.46 -0.232
Engineers and architects 3.96 0.66 -0.162
Mathematical and computer scientists 2.47 1.44 -0.133
Natural scientists 0.55 0.37 -0.171
Health diagnosis and treatment 1.47 6.10 -0.511
Teachers (primary and secondary) 0.44 1.83 -0.351
College and university instructors 0.20 0.31 -0.203
Librarians, archivist and curators 0.02 0.05 -0.084
Social scientists and planners 0.24 0.32 -0.275
Lawyers and judges 1.03 0.64 -0.219
Artists and entertainers 1.71 1.71 -0.194
Health technicians and specialists 0.42 2.88 -0.145
Science technicians 1.44 0.56 -0.181
Software developers 2.13 0.73 -0.137
Other operators and technicians 0.61 1.29 -0.204
Service sales representatives 1.70 2.08 -0.483
Commodities sales representatives 7.49 6.98 -0.476
Office supervisors 1.09 3.18 -0.226
Receptionists and typists 0.31 3.01 -0.257
Secretaries 0.17 7.68 -0.158
Records and financial clerks 0.50 5.65 -0.181
Communication, mail, and message dist. 3.12 2.93 -0.201
Adjusters and investigators 1.48 5.16 -0.235
Miscellaneous administrative support 0.52 3.85 -0.314
Police, fire, and protective services 0.63 0.30 -0.080
Food preparation and services 2.07 3.61 -0.193
Health service occupations 0.25 4.10 -0.148
Building and personal services 2.10 2.54 -0.232
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations 1.60 0.37 -0.131
Automobile and electric mechanics 8.12 0.44 -0.052
Construction workers 7.81 0.23 -0.177
Extractive occupations 0.06 0.00 -0.018
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Table A.1: Mean female wage gaps in the private sector, by occupation
Occupation Pct. males Pct. females w¯occf − w¯occm
Precision production workers 4.67 2.25 -0.364
Machine operators 4.61 2.71 -0.316
Welders and hand-assembly occupations 3.21 2.11 -0.270
Transportation and mat. moving occs. 7.76 0.77 -0.215
Helpers and other laborers n.e.c. 4.14 2.07 -0.214
Total 100.00 100.00 -0.287
Table 4: The two middle columns calculate the percentage of private sector employees
for each sex and occupation. The rightmost column displays the difference between
average female log earnings and average male log earnings for each occupational
grouping.
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Table A.2: Mean female wage gaps in the public sector, by occupation
Occupation Pct. males Pct. females w¯occf − w¯occm
Managers 11.09 9.11 -0.198
Accountants and auditors 1.36 2.03 -0.263
Analysts, HR, and labor relations 0.86 1.80 -0.196
Inspectors and management support 1.94 1.33 -0.108
Engineers and architects 2.80 0.36 -0.087
Mathematical and computer scientists 2.41 1.40 -0.076
Natural scientists 2.04 0.76 -0.105
Health diagnosis and treatment 1.45 4.64 -0.336
Teachers (primary and secondary) 12.55 31.72 -0.153
College and university instructors 4.28 2.86 -0.212
Librarians, archivist and curators 0.38 1.28 -0.131
Social scientists and planners 0.78 0.67 -0.142
Lawyers and judges 2.04 1.25 -0.139
Artists and entertainers 0.72 0.58 -0.085
Health technicians and specialists 1.04 1.30 -0.148
Science technicians 1.31 0.45 -0.143
Software developers 0.83 0.44 -0.062
Other operators and technicians 0.53 0.79 -0.447
Service sales representatives 0.27 0.26 -0.216
Commodities sales representatives 0.28 0.42 -0.297
Office supervisors 1.71 2.16 -0.262
Receptionists and typists 0.20 1.37 -0.206
Secretaries 0.21 8.60 -0.196
Records and financial clerks 0.51 3.60 -0.202
Communication, mail, and message dist. 4.56 3.65 -0.117
Adjusters and investigators 0.53 1.48 -0.203
Miscellaneous administrative support 0.88 4.27 -0.248
Police, fire, and protective services 18.64 2.98 -0.153
Food preparation and services 0.27 1.57 -0.379
Health service occupations 0.44 1.72 -0.199
Building and personal services 4.94 2.62 -0.170
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations 1.56 0.22 0.010
Automobile and electric mechanics 3.96 0.20 -0.050
Construction workers 3.17 0.08 -0.041
Extractive occupations 0.01 0.00 -0.283
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Table A.2: Mean female wage gaps in the public sector, by occupation
Occupation Pct. males Pct. females w¯occf − w¯occm
Precision production workers 1.85 0.31 -0.261
Machine operators 0.51 0.13 -0.293
Welders and hand-assembly occupations 0.51 0.14 -0.153
Transportation and mat. moving occs. 3.76 1.09 -0.286
Helpers and other laborers n.e.c. 2.82 0.35 -0.329
Total 100.00 100.00 -0.207
Table 5: The two middle columns calculate the percentage of private sector employees
for each sex and occupation. The rightmost column displays the difference between
average female log earnings and average male log earnings for each occupational
grouping.
Figure A.1: Male and Female Earnings Densities, Both Sectors
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Appendix B
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a clear explanation of the empirical pro-
cess, from sample creation to differential estimation. The following pages give precise
instructions to obtaining my estimates, including variable categorization, sample ex-
clusions, and coding (if deemed necessary). Anyone attempting to recreate my study
may contact me at emakela@g.clemson.edu if they run into insurmountable issues.
Creating the sample
I begin with the full sample from the American Community Survey (henceforth ACS)
from the years 2000-2011. Data was downloaded from IPUMS USA thanks to ipu.
Variable codes referenced in this appendix are those from IPUMS, and in some in-
stances may differ from the coding structure in the raw ACS data files.
After importing the sample, I first remove all observations reported as living in
group ”institutions” (332558 observations deleted) or ”other group quarters” (236691
observations deleted). Then, individuals over the age of 65 (3612641 observations
deleted) and under the age of 25 (8058616 observations deleted) are removed. To
remove any possible simultaneity in the effects of work and schooling on work pro-
ductivity, I remove all observations currently attending school (762624 observations
deleted). Those who report as having less than 9 years of education are also dropped
from the sample (549852 observations deleted).
Since the study focuses on the work income, those observations who were not
employed and currently working are removed from the sample, along with those em-
ployed by the armed forces (3563403 observations deleted). I then remove workers
who report as self-employed (1062678 observations deleted), unpaid family work-
ers (17634 observations deleted), and those who work for non-profit organizations
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(724216 observations deleted). To conform with previous studies, I focus solely on
full-time, full-year (FTFY) workers, thus I then remove individuals who work fewer
than 40 weeks per year (570795 observations deleted) or fewer than 30 hours in a
typical workweek (392305 observations deleted). Since veterans typically differ from
non-veterans in terms of unmeasured human capital and would thus likely violate
the model’s statistical assumptions, I remove all veterans from the sample (716000
observations deleted). Also excluded are 3603 remaining observations who report as
being employed outside the United States.
I then wish to remove those individuals who report wage income below the legal
threshold, as these observations are either miscoded or misreported in light of all
other restrictions.25 The following code is used to convert earnings to 2011 dollars,
then calculate hourly wages for each observation:
• replace incwage=incwage*cpi11
• gen ww=43.5*(wkswork2==4)+48.5*(wkswork2==5)+51*(wkswork2==6)
• gen totalhours=uhrswork*ww
• gen wage=incwage/totalhours
All observations reporting hourly wage income less than $5.75 (the lowest real mini-
mum wage in the sample period) are then removed from the sample (118583 obser-
vations deleted).
In the spirit of abiding by the unconfoundedness assumption required to interpret
my results, the next sample restriction seemed prudent. It is my opinion that there
are likely to be systematic differences in unmeasured human capital stocks among
different racial groups. To eliminate the possibility of this affecting my results, I
construct my sample using only white observations, dropping all individuals who
25In real terms, the lowest minimum wage in the sample time frame was in 2006 when the real
minimum wage (in 2011 dollars) was $5.75.
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report their race as non-white (956787 observations deleted). For similar reasons, I
also make a few sample restrictions based on occupation. These omissions are listed
here:
• Social, recreation, and religious workers: drop if occ1990>173 & occ1990<177
(27378 observations deleted)
• Supervisors and proprietors of sales jobs: drop if occ1990==243 (170155 obser-
vations deleted)
• Farm operators and managers: drop if occ1990>472 & occ1990<477 (4875 ob-
servations deleted)
The final sample restrictions are made to adhere to the model’s common support
requirement. Because the wage effects of gender are clearly not equal in the public
and private sectors, I conduct the analysis separately for each, meaning that I require
common support for both sectors rather than the sample as a whole. For each sector,
I calculate the ratio of workers in each education/experience/occupation group.26 If
there exists a male or female skill group in either sector with no observations in
the comparable skill group of the opposite sex, all individuals in this skill group are
dropped from the sample. The (unsimplified) code for this restriction is as follows:
• bys sex public: egen count ss=count(logwage)
• bys sex public ed exp occ: egen count sseeo=count(logwage)
• gen w eeo=count sseeo/count ss
• gen weeo mg=w eeo if male==1 & public==1
• gen weeo fg=w eeo if male==0 & public==1
• gen weeo mp=w eeo if male==1 & public==0
• gen weeo fp=w eeo if male==0 & public==0
• bys ed exp occ: egen mg eeo=mean(weeo mg)
• bys ed exp occ: egen fg eeo=mean(weeo fg)
• bys ed exp occ: egen mp eeo=mean(weeo mp)
26I will henceforth refer to each education/experience/occupation grouping a ”skill group”.
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• bys ed exp occ: egen fp eeo=mean(weeo fp)
• gen malew eeo g=mg eeo/fg eeo
• gen femw eeo g=fg eeo/mg eeo
• gen malew eeo p=mp eeo/fp eeo
• gen femw eeo p=fp eeo/mp eeo
• drop if malew eeo g==. (10006 observations deleted)
• drop if femw eeo g==.
• drop if malew eeo p==. (327 observations deleted)
• drop if femw eeo p==.
As is shown above, 10,006 government workers are dropped from the sample for
common support purposes, along with 327 private sector employees.
In sum, I begin with the entire ACS sample from the years 2000-2011, which in-
cludes a total of 26,075,611 observations. After all excluded observations are removed,
the final sample consists of 3,328,908 private sector observations (1,829,855 male and
1,499,053 female) and 854,976 public sector observations (349,928 male and 505,048
female).
Variable creation
The paper focuses on three primary explanatory variables. Education is clearly de-
fined in the ACS. School dropouts are defined as all observations reporting fewer
than 12 years of education, or as having attended grade 12 but not having attained a
diploma. High school graduates include those individuals with a GED or alternative
credentials. The ”some college” category includes all workers who report attending
at some college, but have not attained a bachelor’s degree.27 The advanced degree
educational category includes all observations who report as having attended college
for 5 years or more, or have been granted a master’s, doctoral, or professional degree.
27This category includes workers who have been granted a 2 year associates degree of any kind.
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Experience categories account not only for potential workforce experience, but
also for estimated work intensity. Potential experience is calculated as:
• gen potexperience=age-18
• replace potexperience=age-20 if ed==2
• replace potexperience=age-21 if ed==3
• replace potexperience=age-22 if ed==4
• replace potexperience=age-25 if ed==5
where ed=1,2,3,4,5 corresponds to education categories HS dropout, HS graduate,
some college, bachelor’s degree, and advanced degree, respectively. Because workers
of different skill groups might accrue human capital at varying rates, I use March CPS
samples (years 2000-2013) to calculate the average total hours worked for workers
based on their birth cohort, education, and sex:
• gen birthyr=year-age
• drop if birthyr>1986
• gen cohort=1*(birthyr<1940)+2*(birthyr>1939 & birthyr<1945)
+3*(birthyr>1944 & birthyr<1950)+4*(birthyr>1949 & birthyr<1955)
+5*(birthyr>1954 & birthyr<1960)+6*(birthyr>1959 & birthyr<1965)
+7*(birthyr>1964 & birthyr<1970)+8*(birthyr>1969 & birthyr<1975)
+9*(birthyr>1974 & birthyr<1980)+10*(birthyr>1979)
• bys cohort ed sex: egen wksw=mean(wkswork1)
• bys cohort ed sex: egen hrsw=mean(uhrswork)
• gen totalhrs=wksw*hrsw
• replace totalhrs=totalhrs/2000
To construct experience categories, I merge the compressed CPS dataset with the
ACS microdata by cohort, education, and sex. Experience is then calculated as the
product of potential experience and the work intensity variable totalhrs. This variable
is then converted into a categorical variable based partially on the even distribution
of observations in each category:
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• gen experience=potexperience*totalhrs
• gen exp=1*(experience<10)+2*(experience>10 & experience<15)
+3*(experience>15 & experience<20)+4*(experience>20 & experience<25)
+5*(experience>25 & experience<30)+6*(experience>30 & experience<35)
+7*(experience>35 & experience<40)+8*(experience>40)
Worker occupation was classified as closely as possible following the 1990 census
occupation classification system. Using occupational categories which are too wide
and inclusive would risk invalidating differential estimates because this would increase
the risk of systematic differences in job characteristics between men and women.
However, using occupation categories which are too narrowly defined would result in
greater difficulty achieving common support and would likely mean the elimination
of many more observations from the sample. The following table contains the precise
occupational codes used to create the occupation variable in the paper. Excluded
occupational categories are listed above.
Estimation
Once the sample is created, estimation is relatively straightforward. The code sample
referenced above can be used to calculate the reweighting variables θ in the paper’s
empirical model.28 More precisely, to estimate the counterfactual wage density in
figure 2d, one needs only to estimate the wage density for males in the private sector
with observations reweighted by the function femw eeo p (seen just above). Estima-
tion of counterfactual wage densities 2b and 2c is done in a similar fashion, simply
excluding experience and occupation variables in the weight calculations performed
in the previous code sample.
The process is almost the same when calculating nonparametric average treat-
28When all explanatory variables are accounted for, femw eeo g is equivalent to θf (X) in (7) if we
wish to measure the counterfactual wage density for females in government work. Likewise θf (X)
is equal to femw eeo p if we wish to analyze gender wage differences in the private sector.
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Categorization of occupational codes
Occupation Code
Managers occ1990<23
Accountants and auditors occ1990¿22 & occ1990<25
Analysts, HR, and labor relations occ1990>24 & occ1990<28
Inspectors and management support occ1990>27 & occ1990<40
Engineers and architects occ1990>42 & occ1990<60
Mathematical and computer scientists occ1990>60 & occ1990<69
Natural scientists occ1990>68 & occ1990<84
Health diagnosis and treatment occ1990>83 & occ1990<110
Teachers (primary and secondary) (occ1990>153 & occ1990<164)
*(ind1990!=850)
College and university instructors (occ1990>153 & occ1990<164)
*(ind1990==850)
Librarians, archivist and curators occ1990>163 & occ1990<166
Social scientists and planners occ1990>165 & occ1990<174
Lawyers and judges occ1990>177 & occ1990<180
Artists and entertainers occ1990>180 & occ1990<201
Health technicians and specialists occ1990>201 & occ1990<210
Science technicians occ1990>210 & occ1990<226
Software developers occ1990==229
Other operators and technicians occ1990>225 & occ1990<240
& occ1990!=229
Service sales representatives occ1990>243 & occ1990<257
Commodities sales representatives occ1990>257 & occ1990<300
Office supervisors and equip. operators occ1990>302 & occ1990<309
Receptionists and typists occ1990>313 & occ1990<325
Secretaries occ1990==313
Records and financial clerks occ1990>325 & occ1990<345
Communication, mail, and message dist. occ1990>344 & occ1990<374
Adjusters and investigators occ1990>374 & occ1990<379
Miscellaneous administrative support occ1990>378 & occ1990<390
Police, fire, and protective services occ1990>410 & occ1990<428
Food preparation and services occ1990>428 & occ1990<445
Health service occupations occ1990>444 & occ1990<448
Building and personal services occ1990>447 & occ1990<470
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations occ1990>478 & occ1990<500
Automobile and electric mechanics occ1990>500 & occ1990<550
Construction workers occ1990>550 & occ1990<600
Extractive occupations occ1990>600 & occ1990<620
Precision production workers occ1990>620 & occ1990<700
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Machine operators occ1990>700 & occ1990<780
Welders and hand-assembly occupations occ1990>780 & occ1990<800
Transportation and mat. moving occs. occ1990>800 & occ1990<860
Helpers and other laborers n.e.c. occ1990>860 & occ1990<900
+ occ1990==405
ment effects. When evaluating τATT , I am simply recording the difference between
the average female wage and the average male wage, where the male population is
reweighted such that it has the characteristics of the female population with which
it is being compared. For example, to calculate τATT for private sector workers, one
would use the following code:
• sum logwage if male==0 & public==0
• global i=r(mean)
• sum logwage if male==1 & public==0 [aw=femw eeo p]
• global j=r(mean)
• global ATT=$i-$j
• di $ATT
Linear treatment effect estimates are obtained using the oaxaca package, where τATT
is equivalent to the ”unexplained” portion of the measured mean wage gap. Linear
wage equations are estimated using only dummy variables for education, experience,
and occupation, and do not include interaction terms.
The information provided in this appendix should be adequate to properly re-
construct the dataset and produce the empirical results in the paper. If anyone
attempting this task is having difficulty, please feel free to contact me.
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